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Information Protection 
Since the advent of the modem "information age," it has become increasingly 
important for business professionals to recognize the value of information and the need 
for active protection of valuable information in organizations. This paper seeks to 
develop a general audit program to help organizations evaluate whether their valuable 
information is protected. While far from an exhaustive analysis of the subject, the paper 
brings together a variety of .informational sources and presents the key ideas in three main 
sections. These sections include a general overview of information protection, the actual 
information protection audit program, and six appendices attached at the end of the paper. 
Managing Information 
Because information is a valuable resource, it would be ideal to manage 
information in much the same way that other corporate resources are managed.} This, 
however, has not been the case in recent years. Despite estimates that seventy percent or 
more of the market value of a typical u.S . company resides in intellectual property assets 
(IP), information protection is not a security priority of most companies. In fact, 
formalized valuation and tracking procedures typically do not exist for these assets, and 
since the value of IP assets is not well established, they are often not well protected 
(PWCIASIS p. 4). 
Inadequate protection of valuable assets is a business risk, especially if business 
risk is defined as anything that threatens achievement of business objectives. On the 
positive side, the majority of business risks are internal, can be easily analyzed, and can 
be resp~nded to by a company.2 But in order to increase control over a business risk, a 
company must first recognize that a problem exists. From the perspective of this paper, 
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the problem is inadequate infonnation protection leading to infonnation loss and 
compromIse. 
Information Loss 
In 1999, Fortune 1000 companies sustained losses of more than $45 billion from 
thefts of their proprietary information (PWC/ ASIS p. 3). When the data are compared 
with prior years, they show that incidents of theft are rising. A 1995 survey of 325 
companies reported 32 cases of theft of intellectual infonnation per month in 1995 (losses 
amounted to $5.1 billion). This was more than three times the rate found in a similar 
survey in 1992 (Fialka p. 15). Increasing occurrences of infonnation loss are partly due to 
the unique characteristics of infonnation and to deficient security measures. Unlike 
physical assets, like buildings or traditional inventory, infonnation can be in more than 
one place. "Individuals no longer have to physically steal a product, they can simply 
download infonnation or transmit it electronically to a single accomplice or to tens of 
thousands of people in an instant - and they can do so with total anonymity.,,3 Sensitive 
infonnation can be lost merely by allowing access to it. 
See Appendix A for Trends in Proprietary Infonnation Loss prepared by the 
American Society for Industrial Security and PricewaterhouseCoopers. This appendix 
provides the results and summary of a 1999 survey showing the extent of proprietary 
infonnation loss and the lack of appropriate infonnation security measures in 
corporations. While the summary is repeatedly cited below, the full text is contained in an 
appendix for a more thorough review. 
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Relevant Fields of Study 
While researching information protection, it is possible to encounter many 
specific fields of study connecting to the general topic. Competitive Intelligence (CI) and 
Intellectual Property (IP) are two such fields related to the protection of sensitive, 
proprietary, or confidential information. These fields warrant short definitions. 
Competitive Intelligence can be defined as "information relevant to strategy 
formulation regarding the environmental context within which the firm competes" 
(Miller, A. p. 97), but the Society for Competitive Intelligence Professionals thoroughly 
describes CI as "a systematic and ethical program for gathering and analyzing 
information about your competitors' activities and general business trends to further your 
own company's goals.,,4 
For further information on CI, see Appendix B and Appendix C. Appendix B 
contains a list of ten things CI is and is not; this list was written by Leonard Fuld, a 
pioneer in the CI field. Appendix C contains an overview of the CI profession compiled 
by the Society for Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP) in the form of 
PowerPoint slides. 
The term Intellectual Property usually refers to patents, trademarks, copyrights, 
and trade secrets or know-how (Smith & Parr p. 89). Discussions of IP and intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) usually involve applicable legal and judicial systems.5 In regard to 
information protection, both CI and IP resources provide various countermeasures and 
defensive tactics that can be utilized in the protection of confidential information. 
Other fields of study related to information protection include economic 
intelligence, national security, asset protection, economic espionage, and 
-4-
counterintelligence. A list of internet links to sites covering these fields can be found in 
Appendix F. 
Examples of Information Compromise 
The term "information compromise" refers to any incident in which valuable 
information has reached unauthorized personnel. Information compromise includes any 
thefts and misappropriation of proprietary information. While statistics on information 
compromise were presented above in the "Information Loss" section, the following are 
examples of information compromise (Dutka pp. 295-297): 
• The French intelligence placed agents inside French offices of mM and Texas 
Instruments to steal trade secrets. 
• A CIA document provides case studies of France spying on U.S. military 
contractors and high-tech firms. The French exposed four CIA spies attempting to 
uncover French positions on world trade talks. 
• A company publicly announced the location of an off-site planning meeting 
involving high-level executives. A competitor reserved an adjacent room and 
installed bugging devices to record the proceedings. The competitor created 
better-quality documentation of the session than the company conducting the 
meeting. 
• An employee of a high-tech company, undaunted by a security system that 
prevented unauthorized downloading of information, videotaped confidential 
documents from the computer screen. 
• The president of Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ohio, engaged in a power struggle 
to control the company, found that his company telephone was tapped. 
• A retired Kodak employee pleaded guilty to offering to sell secret company 
information. The former employee stole blueprints, cost breakdowns, 
manufacturing reports, analytical studies, and drawings. 
• An engineer offered to sell his former employer confidential plans that he had 
stolen from the company. The engineer was subsequently arrested by the FBI. 
During the ensuing trial, the defense demonstrated that the company's employees 
did not typically follow procedures to secure information. The court ruled that the 
company had forfeited its claim to classify the information as a trade secret 
because of its failure to protect the information. 
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• In a press release dated March 21, 2001, it was reported that a contract food 
services employee at the Purchase, NY headquarters of MasterCard International 
was arrested for stealing various confidential documents from the credit card 
company. The defendant allegedly offered to sell sensitive and proprietary 
information to Visa International and to record high-level meetings within 
MasterCard if Visa paid and provided him with recording equipment.6 
Types of Sensitive Information 
The categories listed below may help identify the general types of assets that 
might be considered sensitive in a U.S. company. Asset information warranting 
protection may include location, size or capacity, investment, age, etc. The five basic 
categories include the following: 7 
• People 
o Government personnel 
o Contractors 
o Military personnel 
o Contractors 
o Consultants 
o Specialized employees 
o Suppliers or customers 
• Activities/Operations 
o Intelligence collection/analysis 
o Sensitive movement of operations/personnel/property 
o Conduct of sensitive training 
o Communications/networking 
o RDT &E and sensitive technology 
o Production of sensitive technology 
o Protection of nuclear/chemical/biological materials 
o Protection of weapons, explosives, and equipment 
• Information 
o Classified 
o Sensitive compartmented information 
o Top Secret 
o Secret 
o Confidential 
o System designs 
o Intellectual property 
o Patents 
o System capabilities/vulnerabilities 
o Sensitive methods 
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o Sensitive financial data 
o Lists or plans 
• Facilities 
o Industry sites 
o Headquarters 
o Field offices/administrative buildings 
o Training facilities 
o Contractor facilities 
o Storage facilities 
o Production facilities 
o R&D laboratories 
o Power plants 
o Parking facilities 
o Aircraft hangars 
o Residences 
o Computer facilities - data processing or server 
• Equipment/Materials 
o Transportation equipment/vehicles 
o Maintenance equipment 
o Operational equipment 
o Communications equipment 
o Security equipment 
o Weapons 
o Automated information systems equipment 
Protection Programs 
Various models for evaluating and protecting informational assets have been 
developed in response to threats of information compromise. While these general 
programs sometimes use differing terminology, they are often conceptually similar. 
Operations Security (OPSEC), originally designed for government use, is one of the 
typical general information protection programs in security literature and has thus been 
chosen for further explanation.8 An example of specific policies and procedures is 
provided in Appendix D which explains the particular management of sensitive 
information in a merger or joint venture. 
Specifically, the goal of Operations Security is to control information and 
observable actions concerning capabilities, limitations, activities, and intentions, thus 
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preventing or controlling their exploitation by an adversary or a business competitor. 
Overall operational effectiveness is inevitably enhanced by denying an adversary or 
competitor the opportunity to foresee a corporation's intentions, thereby providing the 
opportunity to take measures to nullify any advantage another company may have. Proper 
application of Operations Security measures can maximize a company's potential for 
success. 
Operations Security looks at behavior from adversaries' or competitors' points of 
view. Information that they may need to achieve their goals (to the detriment of the target 
firm) constitutes the critical information of a firm's business operations or activities. 
Denying this critical information to adversaries/competitors enhances corporate security 
and promotes overall effectiveness. 
The Operations Security analytical process focuses on the adversarial exploitation 
of open or public sources and observable actions to obtain evidence of critical 
information. These sources are generally not designated proprietary information. 
Consequently, such sources may be more difficult to control than those that are protected 
as proprietary. Traditional security programs and procedures generally protect classified 
or proprietary information. The Operations Security process is designed to identify those 
indicators that contribute to the loss of critical information through sources that are not 
protected, and to take action to deny or control the availability of those indicators to an 
adversary/competitor. 
Operations Security measures complement physical, information, signals, 
computer, communications, electronic, and other security measures to ensure a totally 
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integrated security package. Reviewing the Operations Security process often discloses 
weaknesses in the application of traditional security practices. 
OPSEC furnishes an analytical framework to determine: 
1. Profiles of selected competitors or adversaries 
2. Information or intelligence that is of greatest value to the competition 
3. The likely targets of intelligence or corporate espionage directed against 
the company 
4. The possible and probably mechanisms that can be utilized to collect 
intelligence against the company 
5. The company's vulnerabilities and safeguard mechanisms that can be 
instituted to limit or minimize these vulnerabilities 
The steps of the OPSEC process are: 
1. Identification of critical information 
2. Threat analysis 
3. Vulnerability analysis 
4. Risk assessment 
5. Applications of appropriate countermeasures, each equally important 
a. Elimination of indicators subject to exploitation 
b. Disruption of effective adversary collection or processing efforts 
c. Prevention of the accurate interpretation of indicators during their 
analysis 
George Jelen, a former director of Operations Security at the National Security 
Agency (NSA) states: 
Each of these phases is important to the integrity and efficacy of the overall 
process. Although each of them has value in and of itself, it is only when all five 
are employed together that the full synergistic value of the Operations Security 
process accrues. Identification of critical information provides focus; threat 
analysis assures realism; vulnerability analysis lends objectivity; risk assessment 
guarantees rationality; and the application of countermeasures ensures utility and 
value. Together they represent a logical and balanced approach to contending with 
risk. The approach which is applicable to any competitive or adversarial situation 
seeks not so much to avoid risk, as this is impossible, but rather to manage it. 
(Miller, J. pp. 221-224) 
By using the Operations Security analytical process, Competitive Intelligence 
professionals will gain a better understanding of what information may be available to an 
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adversary or competitor, the impact of information loss, and a better appreciation of ways 
for its protection. The careful selection of Operations Security measures and their 
appropriate application contributes to overall corporate effectiveness by protecting 
critical information against compromise. 
Economic Espionage Act 
A worthy subject to mention in relation to information protection is the Economic 
Espionage Act (EEA). Many executives mistakenly believe that the EEA automatically 
protects their company's valuable information and eliminates the risk of competitive 
intelligence. A brief explanation of the EEA follows; see Appendix E for a Society of 
Competitive Intelligence Professionals analysis of the EEA and its influence on the CI 
profession. 
The Economic Espionage Act (EEA) of October 1996 made the theft of trade 
secrets a federal crime. Specifically, the EEA makes it illegal to steal or "appropriate" 
rivals' proprietary information without their authorization. Violators could get up to 15 
years in imprisonment and fines up to $10 million (Shaker & Gembicki pp. 217-220). 
A trade secret, as defined by the EEA, encompasses all types of financial, 
business, scientific, technical, economic, and engineering information. These can take the 
form of patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, 
methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs or codes. 
There are two stipulations governing the enforcement of EEA: 
1. The owner must have taken "reasonable measures" to keep the 
information secret, and 
2. The information's value must be derived from not being readily 
ascertainable through proper means, which is to say it is being kept secret. 
These stipulations are somewhat broad and their interpretation is debatable. 
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Review of court cases in which the EEA was applied may be necessary prior to 
the initiation of litigation or other legal proceedings. The following cases involve 
application of and rulings based on the EEA: 
• Midgard Corp. v. Todd, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3874 (loth Cir. March 5, 1997) 
• Merkle v. Johnson & Johnson, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5216 (D. N.J. April 15, 
1997) 
• Blimpie International, Inc. V. Menyforetagen, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3950 
(March 21, 1997) 
• Baystate Technologies v. Bentley Systems, Inc., F. Supp. 1079 (D. Mass. 1996) 
Summary 
This concludes the brief overview of information protection and the first section 
of the paper. As stated above, more information regarding information protection can be 
obtained through the online resources listed in Appendix F. The following section of the 
paper contains the information protection audit program. The audit program was 
developed in response to the increasing risks of sensitive information security 
compromise. Specifically, the program helps auditors evaluate whether proper 
organizational policies and procedures are in place to protect sensitive information. 
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INFORMATION CONTROL AUDIT GUIDE 
Last Update: April 27, 2001 
Location: 
Auditee(s) interviewed: 
INTRODUCTION 
Generic audit program to evaluate information security within a client company 
RESOURCES 
Qualified competitive intelligence professional 
Intellectual property control expert 
A. GENERAL INFORMA TION 
1. Provide a brief overview of the company's competitive intelligence department, if any (size, responsibilities, output, etc.). In addition, document the position of the 
information control function within the firm. Attach a general organizational chart if necessary. 
Attachment Reference: 
2. D L Name T ~ - " - n Title h d titl f h lved in infl f duties issues. 
Attachment Reference: 
B. INFORMATION COUNTERMEASURES 
A variety of factors make an active countermeasures program an important addition to the obvious benefits to the company, including (Miller, J. p. 218): 
1. A due-diligence requirement to ensure that countermeasures sufficient to deter material as well as intellectual property losses are present in the facility 
2. To ensure that such measures are consistent with the changing nature of the threat environment as a required element in the event of any future, potential 
compromises 
INFORMATION CONTROL AUDIT GUIDE 
Last Update: April 27, 2001 
Yes 
or No 
1.....---.----
3. To ensure that the firm meets those industry standards necessary to demonstrate that the firm has undertaken appropriate security measures to protect itself 
Moreover, such reporting as may result from this kind of an effort plays an important role insofar as it serves to document the firm's proactive stance on securing sensitive 
and proprietary information - a legal prerequisite whenever seeking redress through the court system at any point in the future. 
MEMO # Primary Control Test Control 
REF Question Methodology Objective 
1 Is an acceptable process in place to identify Review information classifications to determine if Sensitivity of information should be evaluated 
critical information? consistent criteria are used to initiate sensitive and sensitive information identified and protected 
information into the protection system. Document (Dutka p. 302). 
procedures to classify information as sensitive. 
2 Does the client company use the proper Review the criteria for each level of information Protection should encompass information that is 
evaluation techniques to classify information? classification to ensure that they are fitting and most difficult for a competitor to develop without 
up-to-date for the circumstances. Compare the tacit or active cooperation. This includes 
information the company is collecting (or information on subjects like intentions and goals 
attempting to collect) on its competitors with (McGonagle p. 54). Critical information similar 
similar data of the c1i~nt company. to that desired of a competitor company, 
information that is critical to the client's operation 
as a business, and competitive data crucial to 
completing a profile of the client company should 
all be protected. 
3 Is supplemental sensitive information Examine the data surrounding sensitive A focus should be placed on the subject matter of 
protected? information to make certain that it is also placed information already declared sensitive. 
in the protection process. Component parts that would lead a rival business 
intelligence function to gain useful insights 
should be defined (Miller, 1. pp. 210-211). 
Protection should extend to material alluding to 
confidential information and material from which 
someone could derive critical elements of the 
confidential plan (McGonagle p. 54). 
4 Are adequate procedures in place to Review the declassification process and document Information should only be protected as long as 
"declassify" non-sensitive information? recent incidents of information declassification. necessary (McGonagle p. 54). 
5 Is accurate, current documentation of the Request copies of documentation relating to Documentation is necessary for the formal 
protection process' policies and procedures protection procedures. establishment of policies and procedures (Dutka 
readily available? p. 302) and demonstrates that the client company 
has taken adequate measures to protect itself 
(Miller, J. p. 218). Documentation should be 
current and up-to-date (Shaker & Gembicki pp. 
213-215). 
---
INFORMATION CONTROL AUDIT GUIDE 
Last Update: April 27, 2001 
6 . Does the protection policy begin with upper Determine if protection policy statements are A policy statement from upper management 
management? from the company CEO or other appropriate emphasizes the importance of information 
member of top management. security and the protection process (Shaker & 
Gembicki pp. 213-215). 
7 If of sufficient size, does the company contain Review company organization and the In addition to providing accountability, a standing 
a diverse, standing information protection information security process. Interview committee of appropriate personnel can form and 
policy committee? appropriate members of management. adjust information protection policy as needed by 
business operations. The committee should 
contain representatives from a variety of 
operational areas (competitive intelligence, legal, 
public relations, human resources) (Shaker & 
Gembicki pp. 213-215). 
8 Are common sources of intelligence regularly Determine and evaluate the frequency of official The client company should be aware of the type 
monitored for disclosed information on the monitoring of common sources of competitive and quantity of information about it available to 
company? intelligence (database searches, industry its competitors (McGonagle p. 69). In addition, 
publications, internet, etc.). vulnerability assessments should be conducted on 
a periodic basis (Miller, J. pp. 210-211). 
9 Are senior management and the legal In discussions with management, determine if any The damage that can occur from a deception 
department kept apprised of any deception and deception or misinformation activities have campaign if it is disclosed can far exceed the 
misinformation activities of the company? occurred. Confirm any statements with personnel benefits derived from its use (Shaker & Gembicki 
from the legal, security, and competitive p.217). 
intelligence functions. 
10 Are new innovations or developments patented Review R&D procedures. Examine legal Developments of intellectual property should be 
or copyrighted when appropriate? department documents and interview personnel protected by law whenever possible (Smith & 
from the legal department. Parr pp. 89-120). 
11 Is there a designated contact within the In discussions with management and security The Awareness of National Security Issues and 
company for ANSIR email advisories from the personnel, determine if there are one or more Response (ANSIR) Program is the FBI's National 
FBI? ANSIR intern~l contacts. Document any Security Awareness Program designed to provide 
individual's name and position. unclassified national security threat and warning 
information to U.S. corporate security directors 
and executives. The company should take full 
advantage of any government measures raising 
awareness of security issues and risks.9 
----
INFORMATION CONTROL AUDIT GUIDE 
Last Update: April 27,2001 
C. RELEASE OF INFORMATION 
Yes MEMO # Primary Control Test Control 
or No REF Question Methodology Objective 
1 Are forms of internal communication Review recent employee newsletters and conduct Sensitive information may be compromised if 
(employee newsletters, bulletin boards, a walkthrough of the client company's facilities. unnecessarily placed in prominent areas or 
displays, etc.) monitored for sensitive Document any incidents or discoveries of publications (McGonagle pp. 61-66). All release 
information? sensitive information. of sensitive information should be controlled. 
2 Is only minimal information provided on forms Inquire about the procedures and personnel that Documents intended for any external audience 
intended for external audiences? are used to complete required external forms. This should be reviewed to ensure that they do not 
may include censuses, surveys, government forms contain unnecessary references to sensitive 
such as regulatory filings, or communication with information (McGonagle pp. 61-66). 
nonbusiness publications. 
3 Are all documents containing sensitive Observe the preparation of sensitive documents or Clear markings define documents as sensitive and 
information clearly marked as confidential? review existing sensitive documents. Verify that confidential to a user uneducated about the 
such documents are clearly labeled as informational contents of the documents 
confidential. (McGonagle pp. 61-66). 
4 Is sensitive information only available to Randomly select a topic of sensitive information Sensitive information should only by available to 
necessary internal personnel? and review the dissemination process within the necessary personnel. This includes limiting the 
company. Check regularly produced documents knowledge of the competitive intelligence or 
and mailing lists. Document any instance of information protection units in the company and 
information availability to nonessential personnel. omitting from documents any items no longer 
relevant to the audience (McGonagle pp. 59, 80-
81). J 
5 Do email messages include an automatic Examine email correspondence to determine if An automatic statement accounts for the I 
disclosure (often at the end) stating that any such statement is enclosed. possibility that sensitive information may be 
information is for intended recipients only? contained in messages and may encourage 
message deletion in case of a misdirected 
message. 
6 Is information on the company website Review website posting policy and interview the Sensitive information should not be disclosed 
screened and monitored for sensitive company's webmaster. Search the company's unnecessarily. Extensive job listings or executive 
information? website for any unnecessary disclosures of changes and profiles may provide insight into the 
sensitive information. company's strategies, goals, or objectives (Dutka 
p.88). 
7 Is information reviewed and filtered by Inquire about any recent permitted university Sensitive information can be compromised if it is 
appropriate personnel before it is released for research or projects involving the company. carelessly distributed under the pretense of 
research at universities? Review joint research policy, if any. university research (Dutka pp. 306-307). 
Sensitive material should not be released. 
INFORMATION CONTROL AUDIT GUIDE 
Last Update: April 27, 2001 
8 Are parties required to enter confidentiality 
agreements in the developmental stage of joint 
venture or merger discussions? 
D. SECURITY 
Yes MEMO # Primary Control 
or No REF Question 
1 Does the company have a trained security 
staff? 
2 Is access to areas containing sensitive 
information controlled and limited to necessary 
personnel? 
3 Are employees required to register their entry 
into areas where sensitive information is 
stored? 
4 Are the company's extremely sensitive 
facilities regularly inspected for eavesdropping, 
wiretapping, or alteration of 
telecommunication system programming? 
5 Are all documents containing sensitive 
information disposed of in an acceptable 
manner? 
E. OPERATIONS 
1. HR, Employee education 
Primary Control 
uestion 
Review procedures for joint venture discussion. 
Interview appropriate management personnel and 
discuss recent joint venture or M&A activity. 
Test 
Methodology 
Interview appropriate management personnel; 
review organizational chart. 
Review security procedures and policy. Examine 
any entry or security logs of the company. 
Review security procedures and policy. Examine 
any entry or security logs of the company. 
Determine if and how often inspections occur. 
Review procedures and interview personnel to 
determine who completes the inspection. 
Inquire about document disposal process. 
Observe disposal of documents containing 
sensitive information. 
Test 
Methodolo 
------ - ----
The company should monitor and control access 
to confidential information or trade secrets that 
should not be known by a competitor (Wolf p. 
230). 
Control 
Objective 
The company should have trained security 
personnel on staff to provide professional 
expertise and accountability (PWC/ASIS p. 15). 
Access to facilities or areas containing sensitive 
information or material should be limited (Dutka 
p. 300; PWC/ASIS p. 27). 
Access to facilities or areas containing sensitive 
information or material should be limited (Dutka 
p. 300; PWCI ASIS p. 27). 
Eavesdropping, wiretapping, or alteration of 
telecommunication system programming should 
be detected (PWC/ASIS p. 21). 
Rifling garbage in an attempt to cull valuable 
information is believed to be the number one 
method of business and personal espionage 
(McGonagle p. 55). Documents should be 
securely and consistently destroyed (preferable 
~edded or incinerated). 
Control 
Obiective 
- ' 
INFORMATION CONTROL AUDIT GUIDE 
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1 Are employees advised and/or reminded of Inquire about the preparation procedures for any Sensitive information should not be unwittingly 
information control procedures prior to any such event. Review any preparation documents to disclosed by an unprepared employee 
trade show, interview, or meeting where verify that they contain general lists of (McGonagle p. 67). 
competitors may be present? information that is too sensitive for specific 
discussion. 
2 Do employees deal with incoming solicitations Review company policy to confirm that Employees should use requests for information to 
of information in an appropriate manner? procedures are in place for employees to: obtain data about solicitors (Miller, 1. p. 215). 
1. Get name, firm, and contact information 
of the caller 
2. Ask precisely what kinds of information 
is desired and the deadline, if any, and 
3. Report the contact to a specific 
individual in the security department for 
follow-up. 
Interview and observe employees to ensure that 
policy is followed. 
3 Are appropriate employees required to sign Randomly select and review the personnel files of Secrecy and associated agreements limit the risk 
official secrecy and associated (non-disclosure) employees to determine if any such agreement is of sensitive information being used as a 
agreements? utilized. These should include agreements competitive force against the company (Shaker & 
pledging no competition against current company Gembicki pp. 213-215). 
programs for a specified period of time should the 
employee leave, no raiding of company personnel 
to accompany a departed employee, and invention 
covenants. 
4 Are thorough background checks conducted of Review hiring procedures and personnel files to Establishing a contact within a company is a most 
all employees? determine if thorough background checks were effective way to obtain confidential information 
performed and documented. (Dutka p. 299). 
5 Are complete background investigations Review procedures for hiring temporary and Contract employees and subcontractors are 
completed on the company's non-traditional contract workers. Examine work contracts. considered a risk to proprietary information 
workers (especially temporary and contract (Dutka pp. 306-307; PWC/ASIS p. 3). 
staffs)? 
6 Are temporary workers, including interns, not Interview HR personnel and review recent Temporary workers and interns should not be 
assigned to projects or work areas containing assignments for temporary workers. assigned to facilities or functions where they will 
sensitive information areas? be exposed to sensitive information (Dutka pp. 
306-307; PWC/ASIS p. 21). 
7 Do employees undergo information security Review the agenda for new-hires and discuss Employees should receive information security 
training upon employment? training policies with HR personnel. training upon employment with the company 
(PWC/ASIS p. 15). 
INFORMATION CONTROL AUDIT GUIDE 
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8 Does the company provide employees with Interview HR personnel and policies concerning In order to safeguard sensitive information, 
continued information security training and continued security training. Examine the employees should remain informed about proper 
awareness? schedules of key employees to ensure that they security procedures and any new developments in 
have undergone additional security training. sensitive information control (PWC/ASIS p. 15). 
9 During exit interviews, are employees Review the exit or termination procedures of HR. Exit or termination interviews reminding 
reminded of obligations to the company Interview personnel to ensure that proper exit employees of their continuing obligation to 
regarding sensitive information? interviews are conducted. safeguard the trade secrets and proprietary 
information to which they had access during the 
course of their employment are effective at 
preventing many problems and are another 
method of communicating the organization's 
vigilance in defending its intellectual property 
rights (PWCI ASIS~. 27). 
2. Travel 
Yes MEMO # Primary Control Test Control 
I or No REF Question Methodology Objective 
1 Are travel plans of key company officials Evaluate internal access to the travel plans of Travel plans of key company officials could 
treated as sensitive information when executive personnel and the release of travel plans indicate an impending merger or acquisition 
necessary? to the public. (Shaker & Gembicki p. 206). Access to the travel 
plans of key executives should be restricted to 
necessary personnel. 
2 Is the discussion of sensitive information Review travel and communication procedures for Public and cellular telephone conversations may 
restricted to secure telephones only? sensitive information. Interview traveling be overheard or intercepted. Discussion of 
personnel to ensure that proper procedure is sensitive information in this manner should be 
followed. limited or avoided (McGonagle pp. 78-79). 
3 Are travelers encouraged to avoid the use of Review travel and communication procedures for Because information can be easily seen by hotel 
hotel fax machines? sensitive information. Interview traveling staff or sent to an unauthorized party, the use of 
personnel to ensure that proper procedure is hotel fax machines for outgoing and incoming 
followed. messages containing sensitive information should 
be avoided (McGonagle pp. 78-79). 
4 Are laptop computers used only in secure Review travel and communication procedures for Sensitive information on computer screens can be 
locations? sensitive information. Interview traveling compromised if a laptop computer is operated in 
personnel to ensure that proper procedure is plain view in a public place (hotel lobby, airplane, 
followed. airport concourse, etc.) (McGonagle pp. 78-79). 
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5 Is sensitive information not left unattended in Review travel procedures for personnel carrying Foreign hotel rooms occupied by visiting business 
hotel rooms? sensitive information. Interview traveling executives are common targets (Dutka p. 299). 
personnel to ensure that proper procedure is 
followed. 
6 Is sensitive information transferred only Review travel and communication procedures for Fax transmittals and electronic data interchanges 
through secure lines of communication? sensitive information. Interview traveling are routinely monitored in some countries (Dutka 
personnel to ensure that proper procedure is p.299). 
followed. 
3. General, purchases 
Yes MEMO # Primary Control Test Control 
or No REF Question Methodology Objective 
1 Are appropriate precautions taken to conceal or Review or observe procedures for such purchases Important aspects of sensitive information should 
disguise especially sensitive purchases? to determine if protection measures are sufficient. be protected. Measures should be appropriate 
Procedures may include purchasing through based on sensitivity of the purchase (Miller, J. pp. 
several captive companies or staggering 210-211). 
purchases over a period of several months. 
2 Is sensitive material eliminated from plant or Determine policy and procedure for facility Proprietary information, especially advanced 
facility closing sales? closings. technical material, should be kept confidential or 
sold to appropriate buyers only (Fialka pp. 29-
49). 
3 Are sensitive negotiations held in a secure, Review procedures for arranging important or For security purposes, the location of sensitive 
unannounced location? confidential negotiations. Determine that recent negotiations should be kept confidential (Dutka 
negotiations conformed to Qolicy. pp. 295-296). 
4 Does the company have a safe system in place Examine procedures for receiving bids and review Bidding information and the bidding process 
to receive competitive bids? recent bidding processes. should be free from any unauthorized tampering 
(Fialka pp. 130-131). 
5 Is a thorough background investigation Review procurement procedures. Determine if Suppliers and original equipment manufacturers 
i 
completed on major suppliers and original investigations are conducted prior to contract or are often exposed to a large amount of sensitive 
equipment manufacturers (OEMs)? order assignments. company information (Fialka p. 15; PWC/ASIS p. 
3). These entities should be investigated before 
information is released. 
6 Does the company assess the security of Inquire about security procedures for the original The security of partners and vendors should be 
partners and vendors? establishment of partner or vendor status. Review assessed prior to entering into any relationship in 
current partner and vendor policies concerning the which sensitive material may be transferred 
transfer of sensitive information. (PWC/ASIS p. 15). 
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F. PROTECTION COMPROMISES 
1. General 
Yes MEMO # Primary Control Test Control 
or No REF Question Methodology Objective 
1 Does protection policy define what constitutes Ensure that protection policy procedures contain Personnel should be able to accurately recognize 
an informational security compromise? an appropriate definition of a security when sensitive information has been 
compromise. misappropriated (Shaker & Gembicki pp. 213-
215). 
2 Are reaction procedures outlined for situations Review policy and protocol to determine that The protection policy should specify what 
involving the compromise of information? contingency plans are in place for compromises procedures should be taken upon discovery of 
of security. Interview employees to determine if compromises and what legal actions and remedies 
policy has been followed in recent incidents of the company will take. Employees should be 
compromise, if any. aware of and follow procedures (Shaker & 
Gembicki pp. 213-215). 
2. Court Action - Keep in mind that once a trial has begun, everything that is introduced as evidence and all the transcripts of the trial are generally (and usually 
automatically) a part of the public record . .. While you cannot control what your opponent introduces into evidence, you can ask the court, in advance if possible, to take 
special measures to keep such matters in confidence - and out of the public record. (McGonagle 74) 
Yes MEMO # I Primary Control Test Control 
or No REF Question Methodolo2Y Objective 
1 If court action is initiated, does the company Review the company's procedures for court Disclosure of sensitive information should be 
have the other side sign an agreement action. Discussion with the company' s attorneys limited in court proceedings (McGonagle p. 74) . 
(stipulation) to keep certain documents or or legal department may be necessary. 
information in confidence? 
2 Is a request made of the judge to enter a Examine the client company's procedures for Sensitive information in court rulings should be 
protective order controlling who sees the court action or interview appropriate personnel in controlled if possible. A protective order of the 
discovery and under what circumstances? the legal department. Review recent court cases, judge supervising the discovery may have the 
if applicable. parties place discovery documents in a location 
where they are subject to inspection only, but not 
copying, if they are very sensitive (McGonagle p. 
74). 
--
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G. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
Yes MEMO # Primary Control Test Control 
or No REF Question Methodology Objective 
1 Are sensitive files encrypted within the Review the company's computer security policies Sensitive information should be protected in 
company's computer system? and procedures. Interview system personnel to electronic format. Encryption provides an 
ensure that policy is adhered to. additional level of protection for information 
contained in computer files (Fialka p. 15). 
2 Is the company's computer security equipment Review the company's computer security policies Sensitive information should be protected in 
installed and updated on the computer system? and procedures. Interview system personnel to electronic format. Security equipment aids in 
ensure that policy is adhered to. Examine protection only if it is installed and used properly 
.computer files to verify that security software is (Fialka p. 15). 
in use and current. 
3 Are employee passwords kept secure and Review the company's computer security policies Access to the company's computer system should 
changed at least once a month? and procedures. Interview system personnel to be limited to authorized personnel (Fialka pp. 
ensure that policy is adhered to. 101-112). 
4 Are one-time password generators used for Review the company's computer security policies Providing a new password for each important 
important computer entries and alterations? and procedures. Interview system personnel to computer entry ensures that entries will not be 
ensure that policy is adhered to. duplicated (Fialka pp. 101-112). 
5 Does the company require screen saver Examine one or more computer terminals to Screen saver passwords reduce the risk of 
passwords on all computer terminals? determine if screen saver passwords are standard. unauthorized access to sensitive information on 
! Interview IT personnel and review policy. unattended computers (PWC/ASIS p. 15). 
6 Does the company encrypt data transmitted Review the company's computer security policies Sensitive information should be protected in 
over the internet? and procedures. Interview system personnel to electronic format. Encryption provides an 
ensure that policy is adhered to. additional level of security assurance (PWCI ASIS 
p. 15). 
7 Does the company use only licensed software? Examine installed software on computer terminals The use of licensed software limits the risk of file 
to ensure that only official, licensed versions are corruption or compromise by illegal or altered 
installed. software code. (PWC/ASIS p. 15). 
8 Are digital forms of sensitive information Review the company's computer security policies Sensitive information should be protected in 
secured comparable to hard forms? and procedures. Interview system personnel to electronic format with the same enthusiasm that it 
ensure that policy is adhered to. is [.>rotected inp~[.>er format (PWC/ASIS p. 15). 
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End Notes 
lIn a 1985 proposal of Information Resource Management (IRM), Diebold (p. 41) states 
that IRM means "Managing information as a resource in much the same way that other 
corporate resources are managed." 
2Tritter (p. 14) asserts, " ... a business risk is anything that threatens achievement of 
business objectives. Such risks could be environmental, such as the strength of national 
economy ... The majority of business risks, however, are internal. .. Business risks can be 
easily analyzed in CSA [Control Self-Assessment] sessions, and proper solutions can be 
put in place to strengthen the company's responses to them." 
3This information is found at the Federal Bureau of Investigations website: Intellectual 
Property Crimes section <http://www.fbi.gov/programs/fc/fifu/about/aboutipc.htm> 
~his quote is found on the website of the Society of Competitive Intelligence 
Professionals (SCIP) <www.scip.org> and in Appendix C, an overview of the 
Competitive Intelligence field compiled by the SCIP. 
5For information on legal strategies for protection of IP rights, see Simensky 15.1-15.54. 
For information on proactive auditing ofIP, see Simensky 7.1-7.9. An intellectual 
property audit is an internal review of the intellectual property rights (IPRs) of a business 
and how those rights are managed. 
6The press release for this final incident is found on the U.S. Department of Justice 
website at <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/Estrada.htm> 
7The majority of this list is found at the Defense Security Service's counterintelligence 
website <http://www.dss.mil/cithreats/protect.htm>. The added points were discovered 
through additional research. 
8The following Operations Security (OPSEC) information is compiled from information 
found in Shaker & Gembicki pp. 206-207 and Miller, J. pp. 221-224. 
9For further information on the Awareness of National Security Issues and Response 
(ANSIR) program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), see the FBI website at 
<http://w\\.w.fbi.gov/programs/ansir/ansir.htm> 
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Appendix A: 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP and the American Society for Industrial Security, 
International 
Trends in Proprietary Information Loss 
Survey Report 
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Key Survey Findings 
• In 1999, Fortune 1000 companies sustained losses of more than $45 billion from thefts 
of their proprietary Information.' 
• Forty-four companies of the total 97 that responded reported a total of over 1,000 inci-
dents of thefts. Of these, 579 incidents were valued with a total estimated loss of near-
ly $1 billion dollars. The average company responding reported 2.45 Incidents with 
estimated losses per Incident of over $500,000. The vast ml!Jorlty of the reported Inci-
dents were in High Technology (530) and Services organizations (356). Although 
Manufacturing reported only 96 inCidents, the acknowledged losses of manufacturing 
companies accounted for the m~orlty of losses reported in the survey, and averaged 
almost $50 million per incident. 
• The global Internet and proliferation of information systems have significantly 
increased the risks to corporate proprietary Information, 
• The greatest known losses to American companies are In manufacturing processes and 
research and development information. 
• The number of reported incidents per month has increased dramatically within the last 
17 months. 
• Forty-five percent ct companies responding to the American Society for Industrial 
SecurltylPricewaterhouseCoopers ("ASISlPricewaterhouseCoopers") survey Indicate 
one or more incidents of information loss, theft and/or misappropriations. 
• On-site contractor employees and original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) are now 
perceived by companies responding to the survey to present the greatest threat to 
corporate proprietary Information. 
• The ml!Jorlty of companies responding to the survey have not effectively met the 
challenge of providing a framework In which to safeguard proprietary Information. 
• Consistent mechanisms and processes for determining the value of proprietary 
information are not In place at most Fortune 1000 companies. 
I For the ptlposes of this StXVey we are Umlting our definition of proprietary information to that information 
which is not within the public domain and which the owner has taken some messures to protect. While corn~ 
monly referred to as "trade secrets, " this information is typically protected under both State end Fedorallaw. 
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00 
Propnctary mformrlt/on protect ion 
diffels significantly from the ocher 
security disciplines. 
The Nature of the Proprietary 
Information Loss Problem 
Over the past few years th is annual report has highlighted the fact that documented 
losses of trade secrets and other proprietary information cost US companies tens of 
billions of dollars annually. Recent high profile incidents involving mi!ior U.S. 
companies Illustrate that misappropriation of sensitive proprietary Information has 
become a serious problem afflicting many business organizations. Th is year, 
PricewaterhouseCoopersjolned with ASIS to conduct the Trends in Proprietary 
Information Loss Survey in an effort to raise awareness of these important strategic 
issues throughout the business community and among corporate counsel and senior 
management, in particular. 
Although 70 percent or more of the market value of a typical US company resides 
In intellectual property (IP) assets, typically formali zed valuation procedures do not 
exist and thus these assets are not tracked In corporate accounting systems: Since the 
value of IP assets is not well established, they are often not well protected, thereby 
contributing to the current problems associated w ith theft of trade secrets and 
proprietary information. 
Proprietary information protection differs significantly from the other security d isci-
pl ines. It differs from computer and network security services, as the focus is on 
managing and protecting the intangible assets In whatever medium or form they ex ist, 
which may not be limited to computerized forms. It also differs from the classic physi -
cal security services even though it may involve guard forces and alarm systems. The 
challenge facing security professionals Is to improve proprietary information protec-
t ion through a more systematic cooperation with the corporate legal department, 
compliance, human resources and the business units to address the many forms of 
"non-physical " harm to the enterprise. The primary focus of these coordinated efforts 
should be on preventing and responding to theft, misappropriation or infringement of 
the client's intellectual property rights In the physical world as well as addressing the 
new challenges ar ising from the vast increase in electronic commerce and operations 
in cyberspace. 
Proprietary information assets are vital to the success of many, perhaps most busi-
nesses at the end of the 20th Century. The importance of these assets, while often not 
formally "valued" by many companies, cannot be underestimated. In tOday's h ighly 
competitive environment, It is essential for American businesses to recognize that the 
intellectual assets of every business are highly sought-after commodities. 
Competitive Intelligence gathering has become an essential part of international busi-
ness. Many organizations are fearful they w ill be left behind if they don 't use every 
means at their disposal to gain a competitive edge over their r ivals. This has resulted 
In many companies forming specialized intelligence gather ing units, to ensure t imely 
and accurate information is available. While many "ethical " intelligence practitioners, 
such as the members of the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP) 
adhere to professional codes of conduct, the field is also populated w ith practitioners 
concerned solely w ith achieving results . Some practitioners, such as " retired" person-
nel from foreign governmental clandestine Intelligence services, may resort to patently 
Il legal means to obta in Information. 
The loss of proprietary intellectual assets through unethical or Illegal means costs 
businesses significant amounts of lost profits and reduces new opportunities for future 
business success. In extreme cases It may result In the total loss of the business. 
Information gathered through the ASIS/Pri cewaterhouseCoopers Trends in Proprietary 
Information Loss Survey suggest that monetary losses and other negative business impacts 
from theft, misappropriation and infringement will Increase in the foreseeable future. 
Till,' loss of proprwtary IIlceflccCLIal 
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Survey Question Responses 
The Survey instrument will be available on the ASIS web site at 
www.asisonllne .org. The questions and responses have been summarized 
and charts provided where appropriate to highlight significant findings and 
observations. To facilitate the analysis of the responses, organizatIons have 
been allocated to four main groups : Manufacturing, High Technology, 
Financial/Insurance or ServIces. 
1. For each of the items listed, how high or low IS the 
potential threat to your company's intellectual property (IP)? 
(1 - highest, 4 - lowest) 
InSldeB Score EKlemal Scot·., 
Current Employees 2.46 Domestic Competitors 2.82 
On-site Contractors 2.29 Foreign Competitors 2.93 
Former Employees 2.74 Computer Hackers 2.75 
Vendors/Suppliers 2.81 The Media 3.28 
Strategic Partners 2.64 Intelligence Services 3.28 
OEMs 2.27 
Average 2.53 Average Score 3.01 
The threat posed by persons within the organization Is still considered to be a primary 
threat to corporate information. Responses to this question were consistent with each 
of the previous surveys. This year OEMs (original equipment manufacturers - the 
companies that provide components. sub-assemblies and the like) edged out current 
and former employees as the top concern: OEMs are perceived to represent the great-
est threat to both FinanCial/Insurance and Manufacturing while on-site contractors are 
perceived to be the greatest risk for High Technology and Services firms. 
The average score for all insider relationships was 2.53, suggesting a higher than 
average threat. The common factor in these relationships is that these groups are 
privy to the trade secrets and proprietary information of the company using their 
services. The levels of concern expressed by respondents suggest that more efforts 
may be appropriate to manage these risks. 
Outsiders were, at best, considered to pose only a medium to low level of threat. 
Interestingly, intelligence services (whether governmental or private) are not, accord-
ing to the respondents, considered to be a significant threat. Only High Technology 
respondents expressed significant concerns about foreign competitors, the other 
industry groups apparently finding them to be an average threat. The media was a 
below average concern to virtually all respondents. 
2. Please rank each in terms of the GREATEST RISK of losing 
this type of information. 
(1 - Greatest Risk, 10 - Least Risk) 
Infolm..\lon Category . Seore 
Customer Lists 4.16 
Financial Data 4.46 
R&D 4.72 
Merger/Acquisition 4.84 
Strate8!c Plans 4.86 
Unannounced Product Specs 4.92 
2nd P~ Information 5.07 
Prototypes 5.50 
Manufacturing Data 5.63 
High Technology companies consider the greatest risk Is associated with losing new prod-
uct specifications (4.05) and research and development (4.16). Loss of such information 
early in a high tech product's lifecycle could result In a competitor gaining sufficient time 
to bring to market an equal or superior product with similar features and performance. 
Financial/Insurance respondents were most concerned about loss of customer lists 
(2.75) and second-party Information (3 .35). Financial/Insurance organizations demon-
strate priority concern with losses of second party information. Customers! 
clients of such organizations often entrust personal and private information to the 
company, and such organizations are privy to credit reports, medical and other forms 
of information loss or unauthorized disclosure of which could subject the company to 
liability. as well as adversely impact customer confidence. 
Manufacturing companies were most concerned about research and development 
information (4.16). Services companies were most concerned about financial data 
(4.00). Manufacturing concerns about the loss of R&D information may indicate that 
the longer lead times required to bring a new manufactured product to market Is sig-
nificant, so greater losses could be expected from that type of information. Services 
firms are apparently most concerned that their greatest risks derive from loss or failure 
to safeguard their financial data. Lacking physical or tangible products, they may 
be most harmed by loss of their f inancial forecasts, metries used to cost services or 
other activities. 
w 
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3. During the past year, (i) approximately how many times has 
your company lost the specified information and (ii) what was 
the approximate dollar value of the actual loss? 
Oollar lost TOlal Number Numbl>r or Con'panics Number 01 Numbl>r or 
Industn,,1 Category Reportod or COl11panons Reporting Incidents InCidents Incidents Vatued 
High Technology $119,825,000 
FinanciaVInsurance $2,055,000 
Manufacturing $871,295,000 
Services $5,252,000 
The average company 
rospondll1g ICported 2.45 
mcidcms with oSlimaled los.5(~s 
per mCldent of over 5500.000. 
20 530 252 
20 41 
31 18 96 39 
26 13 356 280 
The Survey responses indicate that manufacturing companies experienced the largest 
losses, due to loss of research and development Information and manufacturing data. 
Manufacturing organizations reported losses of nearly $900 million in 39 incidents. 
Significantly, these same companies only Indicated the risk to such information 
was average (5.23). 
The most frequent reported losses were to high technology companies that lost 
customer lists and data. Survey respondents reported more than 226 incidents of loss 
of such data. Small companies (under $5 bi llion) suffered losses of research and 
development information. Due to their smaller size, losses experienced by smaller 
companies may be much more harmful to their survival and future success. High 
tech companies reported their largest losses from "unauthorized distributions of 
product specifications." This may explain why they noted the greatest concern about 
such losses because a loss of this sort would allow competitors to rush to market 
equivalent products. 
The disparity in both numbers of incidents and financial impact between the 
Manufacturing/High Technology companies and the ServiceslFlnancial/insurance 
groups is significant. Financial companies are governed by strict rules that are derived 
from governmental regulations about information security and as such would be 
expected to have better systems in place to deter and detect such losses. The majority 
of incidents where respondents provided a specific value for a loss in the Services 
group involved copyright infringements. 
The data looks more consistent when sorted by revenue size. 
$5 Billion or Less $196,112,000 38 18 
$6-15 Blllion $606,280,000 33 18 
Over $15 Blllion $196,035,000 26 11 
Medium sized companies appear to have sustained the most significant losses. 
Regardless of how the data is sorted, proprietary information losses are far greater 
than any other type of security-related loss to the company. 
4. How much did loss of information contribute to 
the Identified problems for your company between 
January 1, 1997 and June 1, 1998? 
(1 - significant, 2 - somewhat, 3 - did not contribute) 
Loss of Competitive Advant~e 2.41 2.15 
Loss of Market Share 2.53 2.10 
Loss or Revenue 2.17 2.00 
Increased R&D Costs 2.12 2.10 
Embarrassment 2.41 1.95 
Increased Legal Costs 2.00 2.15 
Increased Insurance Costs 2.41 2.20 
Average Score 2.29 2.09 
2.35 
2.38 
2.35 
2.42 
2.35 
2.19 
2.69 
2.39 
It appears that there are two ml!joi consequences of loss of information to many 
companies (especially High Tech and Services). The first is embarrassment, which is 
tied with increased legal costs for the problems created for companies. It is difficult to 
place a monetary assessment on intangibles such as embarrassment or adverse public-
ity, but the potential consequences can translate into very tangible financial losses if, 
for Instance, shareowners abandon a publicly traded company based upon a publi-
cized information loss Incident. 
The second major consequence, legal costs are very real and represent costs to liti-
gate or prosecute for known or suspected cases of theft or infringement. Legal costs 
also include any supplemental efforts to protect existing patents, copyrights and 
441 324 
108 77 
474 178 
2.29 2.30 
2.38 2.35 
2.19 2.18 
2.76 2.35 
2.05 2.19 
2.05 2.10 
2.33 2.41 
2.29 2.27 
Embarrassment and legal cos! 
were reported as the two miljor 
cons/!qtJ(!r1CCS of loss of 
inlorrrltlflOn to many companies 
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R&D 
Merger! Acquisition 
Strategic Plans 
Unannounced Product Specs 
2nd Party Information 
Prototypes 
Manufacturing Data 
Average Score 
10 
trademarks against infringements. Given that legal costs to litigate a single patent suit 
may exceed $1 million dollars. it is obvious that litigation is a very expensive means of 
enforcement. especially when an organization may have dozens to hundreds of 
patents and other IP to defend . 
Increased Insurance costs were the least important consequence of information loss. 
Information losses tend not to be covered by business insurance. at least in part 
because there is a lack of effective mechanisms to consistently value information . 
Insurance companies may also be reluctant to issue policies for assets that are not 
valued or do not have firmly establ ished guidelines on how to safeguard them. 
5. Rank each of the types of information to indicate 
the GREATEST POTENTIAL DOLLAR LOSS from losing 
this type of information. 
(1 - Greatest Risk. 10 - Least Risk) 
One purpose of this question was to determine any consistency between the informa-
tion loss experience of the respondent companies and their internal assessments of 
what could impact them the most. 
5.12 2.78 4.68 4.36 4.22 
5.76 3.22 4.62 4.18 4.44 
3.47 6.28 2.97 5.36 4.52 
5.00 3.00 4.86 4.14 4.25 
4.11 4.94 4.21 3.82 4.27 
2.94 5.28 4.41 4.82 4.36 
6.17 3.39 5.59 6.23 5.34 
5.06 6.61 4.79 5.59 5.51 
5.53 6.94 4.38 6.18 5.76 
4.79 4.71 4.01 4,96 4.74 
While customer lists/data were thought to pose the greatest risk to revenue loss they 
in fact accounted for just one percent of reported losses. There were 296 incidents 
of customer lists/data loss; however. the total value assigned to those losses was 
only $13.196.000. 
It would appear that companies in Manufacturing perceive the revenue impact 
greater. but that is deceiving. When only Information types d irectly related to their 
business are included in the assessment. the Financial/Insurance group potential goes 
from 4.71 to 3 .47 . 
H igh Technology respondents believe their greatest potential losses der ive from unau-
thorized disclosure of proprietary product specifications. The greatest potential losses 
for Financial/Insurance respondents. are considered to be from customer lists and 
data . Manufacturing noted substantially more concern over research and development 
Information rather than manufacturing data itself. even though actual losses were 
nearly three times higher for manufacturing data than R&D Information. Services firms 
were most concerned about losses of strateg ic plans and road maps. 
Companies with revenues over $15 billion and companies with very h igh percentages 
of temporary employees generally seemed more concerned with losses of research 
and development. Companies with revenues less than $5 billion were most con-
cerned about losses of financial data. 
6. During the past year, please indicate the approximate 
number of times that your company engaged in each of the 
following activities: 
1) Litigation to enforce IP rights; 
2) Inspecting competing products to determine if they Infringe on IP rights; 
3) Hiring an outside firm to evaluate potential infringements; 
4) Hiring a firm to determine If the organization was infringing on others 
IP rights . 
Most respondents did not report any engagements In IP litigation. although High 
Technology organizations seemed to have a higher propensity toward IP litigation 
than the other Industry segments. likewise. only High Technology was reported to 
have engaged In Inspecting a competing product to determine whether It Infringed on 
patents or other IP rights. None of the industry segments were especially likely to h ire 
outside firms to evaluate potential Infringements or to determine if the company was 
infringing on others IP rights. 
7. What percent of all IP lawsuits involving your company 
are currently pending? 
The responses indicate that of those who reported IP litigation. most organizations 
have between 0-25 percent of all IP lawsuits currently pending. This may Indicate that 
the m'!Jority of suits have been settled. 
The greatest known losses 
CO AmcnCfm companies are 
In man(Jfacturing procr!sses 
and msearch and deve/opmcnc 
information 
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8. What percent of all IP lawsuits does your company 
generally settle before trial? 
The responses indicate that about half of the IP lawsuits involving the company are 
settled before trial. 
9. How many IP negotiations does your company currently 
have underway to avoid litigation? 
Most respondents, regardless of industry segment had few pending suits and reported 
they generally settled between 26-50 percent of IP lawsuits prior to trial. High 
Technology companies were more likely than others to engage in IP negotiations to 
avoid litigation, but this did not appear to be a widespread practice. 
10. How often does your company vallie intellectual property? 
(7 - never, 2 - rarely, 3 - ~nce a year, 4 - more than once a year) 
IndU\lry CaIL'!JOI'Y ' , ." Score 
High Technology 2.33 
FlnanclaVInsurance 1.89 
Manufacturing 2.61 
Services 2.37 
Average 2.30 
Few organizations engage in any sort of regUlar review of their intellectual property 
valuations, The most common answers were that IP Is never or rarely valued , 
Somewhat surprisingly, Manufacturing organizations appeared more likely to engage 
in a more formal and scheduled process than High Technology companies, Large 
organizations (those over $15 billion in revenues), were more likely to have a process 
whereby on at least an annual basiS IP is valued. 
11 . Which item MOST FREQUENTLY caw-.es a valuation of 
intellectual property? 
(1 - Most Frequent, 4 - Least Frequent) 
His!! Technolo~ 2.06 2.06 2.18 
Financla1lInsurance 2.39 2.39 2.28 
Manufacturing 1.84 2.32 1.87 
Services 2.32 2.32 1.74 
Average 2.15 2.27 2.02 
Litigation and transactions (such as mergers and acquisitions or divestment) are the 
most common factors cited by respondents for events that trigger an IP valuation . 
Manufacturing respondents appeared to value information for cause more frequently 
than the other three groups. 
12. Who is responsible for valuing intellectulli property 
in your company? 
Attorneys, especially in-house counsel, are more than twice as likely to be responsi -
ble for valuing IP as either the CFO or outside experts. Although this appears to be a 
common practice, attorneys may not have all the necessary training, experience or 
tools to perform the more complex methodologies that are now generally available to 
generate accurate IP valuations, 
13. The THREE most Important factors conSidered when 
valuing intellectual property. 
2.81 
2.38 
2.03 
2.63 
2.46 
IndusltlMI CaIC!JOlY lSI 2nd lid 
High Technology Competitive Advantage Incremental Profit R&D Costs 
2.15 
2.15 
2.02 
2.46 
2.23 
Flnancia1lInsurance Competitive Advantage Incremental Profit Other licensing agreements 
Manufacturing Competitive Advantage R&D Costs Royalties eamed from licensing 
Services Competitive Advantage Incremental Profit R&D Costs 
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In valuing IP, respondents indicated that the most important factor considered is how 
much it contributes to competitive advantage. In descending order of importance, 
respondents indicated the following when asked to rank the most important factors In 
valuing IP: the incremental profit associated with the IP; research and development 
costs in creating the IP; royalties that could be earned by licensing out the IP; and the 
benefits the IP would bring to other license agreements covering similar technology. 
14. The THREE most important factors considered 
when valuing damages associated with the theft of IP. 
Industrial Category lst 2nd 3m 
High Technology Loss of Competitive Advantage Loss of Market Share Loss of Sales 
FlnanciallInsurance Loss of Competitive Advantage Loss of Market Share Loss of Sales 
Manufacturing Loss of Sales Loss of Market Share Loss of Competitive Advantage 
Services Loss of Competitive Advantage Loss of Market Share Loss of Sales 
14 
Respondents Indicated that when valuing IP thefts, the most Important factor they 
consider is loss of competitive advantage; loss of market share is second; and loss of 
sales was the th ird most common response. 
15. Which regulatory groups require your company 
to protect information? 
(Multiple answers are perm itted) 
The U.S. Federal Government appears to have the largest impact on companies from 
a regUlatory perspective, being cited more than twice as often as the other choices. 
However, in the very near futu re this Issue will become much more complex as new 
and more extensive privacy laws impact the Information flow facilitated by electronic 
commerce. This is an especially important issue for US companies do ing business in 
the European Union. Notably, 31 respondents indicated that no regulatory authority 
required them to protect the ir company's proprietary information. 
Indus.rial CalcgOlY Federal Sial<! local None 
High Technology 11 
FlnanciallInsurance 15 11 
Manufacturing 16 4 12 
Services 11 10 
Totals 53 27 31 
16. How often does company take the precautions listed 
below to prevent information loss? 
(1-A/ways; 2 - Sometimes; 3 - Rarely: 4 - Never) 
To facilitate discussion, answers In these areas were grouped into administrative, 
physical and Information systems security as follows: 
AdmlnlStrallve PII)'SIC~.'1 Inronnalton Systems Sncunty 
Information security training 
upon employment 
Non-Disclosure Agreemenls 
Provide Continued Info 
Security Training and 
awareness 
Classify. handle materials 
properly 
Use distinctive markings 
Assess security of 
partnerslvendors 
Destroy sensitive materials 
when no longer needed 
Restrict vendors' access 
to physical spaces 
Restrict access to 
sensitive materials 
Safeguard off-site 
meetings. conferences. 
trade shows 
Require workforce to 
protect while traveling 
Provide security staff 
Secure sensitive materials 
when not In use 
Use only licensed software 
Use screen saver passwords 
Encrypt Data over the 
Internet 
Secure digital form of 
Information comparable 
to hard 
This was not meant to be an exhaustive list of information protection measures, but a 
representative sampling. Based on these groupings, respondents are most likely to 
Implement information systems security measures to protect information and least 
li kely to consider physical measures listed above. 
Induslrlal CatogOf)' . Admm"trallVn PhYSIcal ISS Avf'.rugo 
High Technology 1.65 1.84 1.74 1.74 
FinanciallInsu.rance 1.86 1.88 1.46 1.73 
Manufacturing 1.74 1.88 1.69 1.77 
Services 2.04 1.80 2.02 1.95 
Averages 1.82 1.85 1.72 1.79 
Finance/Insurance respondents took slightly more precautions while the Services 
group took the least. 
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17. For each of the following statements, indicate whether you 
strongly agree (1), somewhat agree (2), somewhat disagree (3), 
strongly disagree (4), or have no opinion (5). 
17(a). Information security is a priority within my company. 
No group of respondents answered that they "strongly agree", and thus no group 
claimed very strong management support. However, the High Technology respondents 
Indicate that information security is more of a priority than in the other three groups. 
This group had the largest number of reported inCidents for the survey, which may 
have influenced the score. Financellnsurance companies were a close second. 
Services respondents indicated that they only somewhat agree that this is a priority. 
17(b). The Internet. networks and computers have created 
significant new threats. 
Regardless of the Industry, many respondents indicated that they "strongly agree" that 
the Internet, networks and computers have created significant new threats. It seems 
that respondents acknowledge that the drive to computerize and connect company 
systems to the global Internet is a new risk factor that deserves serious attention from 
those responsible for protecting the organization's intellectual property and sensitive 
proprietary Information. Although all industry groups displayed a high degree of con-
cern, the Services group showed incrementally more agreement. This may derive from 
a concern that the "product" of such an organization may be dependent on reports, 
models and other computerized intangibles rather than physical product. 
17(c). Information losses are always reported to 
law enforcement. 
There appears to be almost universal agreement on this issue. Given the relatively 
strong results above (where 1 represents always and 5 never) it appears that law 
enforcement Is not receiving many of the Information loss incidents that are known to 
the responding organizations. This could be due to many factors. Perhaps local. state 
and federal agencies are perceived as being ill - equipped to handle the magnitude 
of the problem. The complexity and immediate nature of these Issues compete poorly 
with more violent crimes. In addition, there may be serious concerns that Information 
loss incidents reported to law enforcement may result in adverse publicity and other 
unfavorable consequences to the reporting organization. There may also be a desire 
on the part of many companies to pursue civil remedies in lieu of reporting such 
cases to law enforcement. 
17(d). My company's temporary and contract staffs have 
complete background investigations. 
While on-site contractors are considered to be one of the greatest threats to organ iza-
tional information, most companies did not require these people to undergo back-
ground checks. Background Investigations represent a level of "diligence" easily avail-
able to US-based organizations. The failure to ensure consistency between standards 
applied to the regUlar and temporary/contract staffs creates a gap that could expose 
the organization's key IP and proprietary information to people who have a history of 
committing Illegal acts. 
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17 (cont'd) . For each of the following statements, indicate whether you 
strongly agree (1), somewhat agree (2), somewhat disagree (3), strongly 
disagree (4), or have no opinion (5) . 
17(e). Management takes necessary precautions to prevent 
information loss. 
There is a significant divergence between these responses and the ones In 17(a). The 
difference indicates that existing programs probably have some degree of manage-
ment support, but that in practice, precautions to prevent information loss may not 
always be followed. Taken together these two responses seem to show that even large 
companies have yet to link strong management commitment to protection and consis-
tent compliance w ith precautions needed to safeguard that information and prevent 
loss of their proprietary information and intellectual property. 
17(f). OEM/partner companies provide adequate safeguards 
for my company's information. 
These responses indicate how complicated the world of business has become. This 
score was seven percent lower than the earlier one about precautions within the 
company it!jelf. The new on-line and Increasingly outsource business environment Is 
moving rapidly to global supply chains that involve tens or hundreds of companies 
working transparently to design, manufacture. and deliver goods and services to con-
sumers around the world . Most respondents apparently believe that business partners 
are not doing as much to protect the company's information as they themselves do. 
This gap could develop from failure to communicate and/or enforce the standards of 
the owning company as a condition of the business relationship. 
17{g). My company has effective guidelines for safeguarding 
proprietary Information. 
Guidelines designed to protect proprietary information are viewed as effective at 
most companies, but may not be fully Implemented throughout the corporations. 
Consistent company-wide implementation is likely to become even more difficult as 
corporations increasingly globalize their operations and must contend with diverse 
legal as well as cultural and sociological factors. 
17(h). Law enforcement effectively responds to Information 
loss incidents. 
Survey respondents apparently believe that law enforcement organizations need to 
become more effective at investigating information loss incidents. However, informa-
tion loss incidents are inherently very difficult to investigate. Without the complete 
cooperation of the injured party, a well -trained staff (for both the law enforcement 
agency and the business). and the ability to quickly respond, these investigations are 
virtually Impossible to conduct. 
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17 (cont'd). For each of the following statements, Indicate whether you 
strongly agree (1), somewhat agree (2), somewhat disagree (3), strongly 
disagree (4), or have no opinion (5) . 
17(i). Recent (within 12 months) information loss incidents 
could seriously affect my company. 
There were fairly consistent responses indicating information loss incidents were not 
considered to be a serious problem. However, losses due to misappropriation or theft 
of trade secrets are typically much higher than losses that can be attributed to thefts of 
tangible products. The discrepancy may indicate there is a lack of appreciation for the 
extent of the problem of information loss. It seems that even security professionals do 
not fuily appreciate that information loss is a significant issue. One danger of this 
ambivalent response is that information protection measures may not receive strong 
advocacy during budget processes. This could mean that the meager resources Indi-
cated in the last survey, «3 percent of security budgets spent on Information safe-
guarding), may be at serious risk of reduction If the need arises to cut budgets. 
170). My company has effective information systems 
security procedures. 
The respondents uniformly believe that Information systems security is not completely 
effective in their companies. The overall score indicates a neutral position. 
Information systems security consists of policies, procedures, hardware, software, 
audits, and monitoring. One essential element not yet mentioned is administrative 
sanctions for not foliowing the program. If there Is no down side risk to ignoring such 
procedures then the entire program suffers and vulnerabilities often increase. 
17(k). My company has detected eavesdropping, wiretapping 
or alteration of telecommunication system programming. 
Eavesdropping, wiretapping or alteration of telecommunications systems programming 
was not detected at a significant number of the responding companies. It is possible 
that incidents are occurring but are not detected. If respondents do not perform 
regular inspections, or if the Inspections do not utilize eqUipment, procedures and 
personnel that are technically up-to-date, they may not detect attacks. 
17(1). Temporary/contract employees are not assigned to 
projects or worl<'. areas containing sensitive information. 
The respondents Indicate that contractors and temporary workers may have nearly the 
same access to sensitive information as regUlar employees. The same problem arises 
with the contractors and temporaries that work for other companies such as m~or 
suppliers, vendors or sub-contractors that have access to your company sensitive data. 
When these comments are combined with 17(d) (which indicate few temporary or 
contract employees receive background investigations) It Is possible that a major risk 
to a typical organization's critical IP and sensitive proprietary Information arises from 
the lack of controls over the hiring and deployment of the "contingent" workforce. 
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17 (cont 'd) . For each of the following statements, indicate whether you 
strongly agree (1), somewhat agree (2), somewhat disagree (3), strongly dis-
agree (4), or have no opinion (5) . 
17(m). Sensitive information is seriously at risk 
in my organization . 
Financellnsurance respondents were the most concerned about their current Infor-
mation environment. Their concerns may stem from the governmental oversight they 
face. Service companies were again the least concerned. Notably, Manufacturing 
companies reported that they sustained the greatest proprietary Information losses, 
yet they appear to be relatively unconcerned. 
17(n). Government intelligence/business intelligence/competi-
t ive intelligence staffs have successfully targeted my company. 
The respondents clearly Indicate that intell igence gathering threats are of considered 
to have minimal Impact to their companies. These answers support the proposition 
that known information losses remain principally an insider threat. 
18. To whIch of the following industry groups does your 
company belong? 
To facilitate better analysis the survey respondents were assigned to one of 4 main 
groups: Transportation was grouped into Manufacturing, and Wholesale or Retail 
Trade was grouped Into Services, High Technology and Finance/Insurance remained 
as originally identified. The table to the right gives the numbers in each group. 
19. Approximately what are your company's annual revenues? 
The responses show that the companies in this survey represent a wide range of 
organizations with 38 Indicating they were $5 billion or less in revenues, 33 were 
between $6 and $15 billion and 26 were over $15 billion. 
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20. Approximately what percentage of your company's 
total work force IS comprised of full time regulars, 
temporary/regular part time? 
The responses to this question show that the average company has about 80 percent 
of employees as regular/full time staff. with nearly 10 percent temporary work force 
as well as about 11 percent as regular staff who work a part time schedule. A related 
response in question 17(d) shows that many. perhaps most. companies do not yet 
ensure background investigations are conducted on temporary staff. Similarly, the 
responses to 17(1) indicate many organizations make no effort to avoid assigning tempo-
rary or contractor employees to prqjects or work areas containing sensitive proprietary 
Information. The combination of these three elements: a significant number of 
contract/temporary staff; with unverified backgrounds/credentials; assigned to work In an 
organization's most critical or sensitive areas. or prqjects. could ultimately be disastrous. 
21. Approximately what percentage of your company's total 
workforce is located outside the US? 
The responses to this question show that about 79 percent of the workforce of the 
respondent companies work in the United States. while six percent work In North 
America (Canada and Mexico) and 15 percent are located elsewhere In the world. 
This demonstrates the Increasing importance of the globalization of business. It Is 
important to consider that most global organizations support their overseas operations 
with a global network. This connectivity from remote non-US locations poses addi-
tional challenges to the security of sensitive proprietary Information and especially for 
the digital forms of Intellectual property. The "weakest link" in the safeguards for criti-
cal proprietary information may well be in a small representative office in another 
country where employees enjoy easy access to the company Intranet. 
Is the Loss of Proprietary 
Information a Serious Problem? 
While reported thefts of proprietary Information and the level of concern about the 
threats are low. companies and the professionals dedicated to protecting their ideas 
should not underestimate the impact that a single incident can have on a company. If 
a company hasjust one proprietary information loss Incident but that Incident affects 
the bottom line of the organization. this can create serious competitive and financial 
challenges that extend far into the future. 
In addition. Survey respondents are likely to under-report incidents for at least two 
main reasons. First. many organizations lack the means to detect such losses and pro-
cedures to Investigate or document Incidents when they do occur. Second, there may 
also be concern that reporting losses could only adversely impact the reputation of 
the organization if It ever became publicly known. 
Forty-five percent of responding companies indicate known incidents of Information 
loss. As such. the potential losses deriving from incidents of information loss for all 
respondents may exceed $4.4 billion and the potential losses may reach nearly 
$45 billion by straight-line extrapolation of these results to the Fortune 1000. 
The types of information and the estimated losses by Industry segment are also instructive. 
In Manufacturing. the loss of manufacturing Information comprised nearly three-fourths of 
the total losses ($610 million of $871 million) with research and development information 
as the next most substantial losses in the amount of a little over $215 million. 
High Technology companies reported nearly $120 million In direct losses. but the 
respondents reported the greatest average number of incidents with nearly 67 inci-
dents per company with average loss per incident of about $15 million. 
Services companies eXhibited a more uniform distribution of losses with customer 
lists/data comprising about half the known losses followed by nearly equal losses 
from merger/acquiSition and strategic planning types of information. Interestingly. 
the Services companies reported many incidents (356). more than three times the 
manufacturing incidents. but the average losses per Incident were less than $20,000 
per event. 
In 1999.1=01 tune 1000 companies 
sustained los5es of morc [han 
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Financial/Insurance companies reported the smallest total number of incidents but the 
average losses per event were nearly $350,000. 
If the reported figures are accurate, then the estimated dollar loss In US-based compa-
nies from these types of events may exceed $40 billion annually. This estimate tracks 
closely w ith numbers that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other authori -
ties have prepared. This Is a large number and' should be a m~or concern in any 
company. However, It is important to appreciate that the precise number of the losses 
is much less Important than the fact that losses occur in every Industry, and that many 
may be preventable. 
The most surprising result revealed by th is survey Is that many, perhaps most, 
American companies do not appear to be taking steps to value their Information and 
intellectual properties. In the absence at some sort of assessed value, it Is difficult to 
know how much of corporate assets are at risk or whether the organization is making 
appropriate Investments In protecting proprietary information and other va luable Intel-
lectual properties. 
At present, random circumstances, such as mergers and acquisitions, appear to drive 
most valuation efforts. Although at present there is no commonly available procedure 
for valuing IP, it is frequently required and accompl ished during licensing negotia-
t ions, as well as for litigation when it Is known or suspected valuable IP may have 
been stolen or misappropriated. 
W hat Should Be Done to 
Protect Proprietary Information? 
A well executed safeguarding proprietary information (SPI) protection program should 
commence with an inventory of the key intellectual assets of the organization, as well 
as valuation of these assets. Once this is accompl ished the organization shou ld per-
form a risk assessment and determine which assets are adequately protected and 
which may be at risk . In the Inventory and risk assessment it is important to consider 
the impact of the global Internet and the Increasing digitalization of critica l propri-
etary assets. 
Basic protection measures remain necessary. All employees (temporary, contract and 
regu lar staff) shou ld be subject to background Investigations and required to sign non-
disclosure agreements that clearly enumerate the organization's ownership rights over 
all forms of proprietary information. Physical restrictions, especially over visitors and 
other outsiders, which limit access to organization faci lit ies and to areas containing 
valuable proprietary Information, especially trade secrets, are essentia l. Exit or termi-
nation Interviews reminding employees of their continu ing obl igation to safeguard the 
trade secrets and proprietary information to which they had access during the course 
of their employment are effective at preventing many problems and are another 
method of communicating the organization's vigilance In defending its intellectual 
property rights. These reminders shOUld parallel efforts to prevent terminating staff, 
and others, from physica lly taking hard copy documents, notebooks, prototypes and 
other tangible proprietary materials belonging to the organization. 
The advent of the fully networked enterprise where intranets, extranets and the 
Internet are all used to gain competitive advantage has significantly Increased the 
importance of integrating digital and information systems security measures Into the 
SPI program. The corporate security professional must now must work even more 
closely with the CIO (chief information Officer), the systems security staff as well as 
the organization law department to ensure the organization 's IP protection measures 
address the Increased risks from connectivity and the Internet. These protective mea-
sures must include efforts to identify and safeguard digital Intellectual assets inside the 
networked enterprise. However, given the speed and propagation of Information, 
internal security measures must be supported by an external monitoring and survei l-
lance function. 
In Question 16 of the Survey we provided 18 common precautions that a company 
could implement to prevent Information loss, and we asked the Respondents to Ind i-
cate how frequently they actually used such measures. Although the result showed 
that most organizations are using most of these measures at least some of the t ime, 
this is alarming because It is not enough. A well-executed SPI program would use all 
of these measures most of the time. As a group, the Services firms generally appear to 
have the most work to do, while Financial Services/Insurance organizations arguably 
cla im the best compliance. 
The rmljortly of comparJIcs 
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safeguard proprietary Informal1on. 
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LOS$ of mtel/c.:.'CturJl property iJnd 
s(in~itive propnetary mformatl()n is 
,1 contmUing thrcac 10 the health 
an(i compc/ll1veness or the 
Amencan economy. 
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Conclusions from the 
1998 Survey 
The loss of proprtetary information is a serious threat facing 
American industry. 
This threat applies in both global and domestic marketplaces. Loss of intellectual 
property and sensitive proprietary information Is a continuing threat to the health and 
competitiveness of the American economy. The current survey identifies nearly $45 
billion worth of proprietary information lost in a 17-month period . 
Those with a trusted relationship to the company pose a seri o 
ous threat. 
In contrast to our previous surveys, this Survey reveals that It Is not current or former 
employees that are considered to be the greatest threat to an organization 's propri-
etary information and Intellectual property. This year, on-site contractors and OEMs 
have been identified as posing the most serious threat to proprietary information. This 
result parallels many of the cases brought under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996. 
In several of these cases the individuals Indicted have been either a contracted staff 
member or a temporary employee of the victimized company. 
The Internet and associated technologies are perceived as 
Significant threats to every company 's ability to protect the 
confidentiality of their proprietary information. 
Respondents strongly agreed that the Internet, networks and computers and related 
technologies have created significant new threats to sensitive proprietary Information. 
It is now common that 50 percent or more of the value of companies derives from 
their intangible assets, principally their proprietary Information, trade secrets and pro-
prietary knowledge. Since 90 percent or more of these assets can be found In digital 
form In the enterprise, the advent of the fully networked organization can create huge 
risks to these digital assets. 
Businesses of all sizes are affected. 
Even though the majority of the reporting businesses are relatively large, having $6-
$15 billion or greater annual revenues, smaller companies were also affected by 
information loss. This multifaceted issue affects them all because every size and type 
of business has sensitive proprietary Information such as customer lists, customer pref-
erences, pricing Information, Innovations, future business plans, and prqjected sales 
and revenues figures that are at risk of theft or misappropriation. 
About the Respondents 
The survey received responses from 97 qualified companies, which equates to nearly 
a 10 percent response rate for the Fortune 1000. There were 26 Services, 21 
Financellnsurance, 20 High Technology, and 30 Manufacturing companies. The typi-
cal responding company has 80 percent of its staff working In the United States. 
The annual revenue breakdown of respondents is as follows: 40 percent had revenues 
of less than $5 billion, 33 percent had revenues between $6 billion and 15 billion, 
and 27 percent were over $15 billion.) 
As In past surveys, larger companies submitted the preponderance of responses. 
Because the survey forms are sent to Fortune 1,000 companies, the survey is pr~u­
diced toward companies with large revenues. 
Employees 
FUll -time personnel average 80 percent versus 9.2 percent part-time employees and 
11 .2 percent contact staff. One of the details that emerge upon close study of the 
responses is that there are some areas where temporary and contract workers may be 
creating avoidable risks for company. When conSidering threats to trade secrets and 
efforts to manage risk to proprietary Information, distinctions between kinds of work-
ers are increasingly Important. 
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Survey Methodology 
The survey was conducted under the direction of William C. Bonl, of 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Investigations LLC, and the members of the ASIS Standing 
Committee on Safeguarding Proprietary Information led by Mr. James O'Neil from 
United Technologies Corporation. Technical support was provided by the 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Survey Center In Bethesda, Md. Dan Swartwood and Bill 
Boni with the assistance of the PrlcewaterhouseCoopers Survey Center drafted the sur-
vey instrument and solicited suggestions to improve it from the Committee members. 
ASIS provided a mailing list of Fortune 1,000 companies and a 
PricewaterhouseCoopers list of General Counsel of the Fortune 500 companies. The 
surveys were mailed to the senior security professiona ls and General Counsel by 
name. If there was no known name for the security director or general counsel It was 
sent generically to the security director or senior security profeSSional of the organiza-
tion. A card was provided to allow survey participants to acknowledge their participa-
tion In the survey while keeping their responses anonymous and private. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers statistical and research expertise has been essential to com-
plete this report, and to support the validity of the Survey findings. As In any survey. 
the numbers presented do not reflect 100 percent of the respondents. Most respon-
dents declined to answer at least some of the 21 questions. 
As in the past, there was no way to Identify any response with any company. The 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Survey Center received the survey instruments and created 
the survey spreadsheet. After the data was entered and validated, the surveys were 
destroyed. The authors were then provided the data In Microsoft Excel . The confiden-
tial list of participating companies is maintained by ASIS. 
The survey covered a 17-month period, January 1, 1997, through June 1, 1 gga. 
C Copyright 1999 American Society ror Industrial Security, International and PrlcewaterhouseCoopers LLP. 
Selected References 
Web Sites: 
The following web sites, although not all inclusive, are excellent resources that offer 
security practitioners a wealth of information on counterintelligence, economic espi-
onage, counterterrorism, security, legal and Infrastructure protection. 
Air Force Office of Special Investigations wwwafmlllnewsitactsheet 
Defense Security Service -~ 
Extranet for Security Professionals - wwwxsp org 
Embassy Page www.embpage.org 
FBI ANSIR - www fbi govlpr~ramslanslrlansir 
Intellectual Property Owners Association - www.ipo org 
National Counterintelligence Center - www.nacic.ggy 
National Security Institute -~ 
National Infrastructure Protection Center - www.nipc goy 
Naval Criminal Investigative Service - wwwncjs nayymjl 
Overseas Security Advisory Council - www.dss.state goy 
Overseas Security Advisory Council Publications - WWWdss.state goY/pybllcatjons 
PrlcewaterhouseCoopers wwwpwcglobal com 
Travel Warnings and Consular Information Sheets - wwwtravel state goy 
U.S. Department of Commerce - wwwbxa goy 
U.S. Department of State-Bureau of Consular Affairs - wwwtrayel.state goy 
U.S. Security Policy Board - www.spb.ncrgoy 
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President 
RJ. Heffernan & Associates, Inc. 
203-488-2235 
Donna Jo Kahl, CPP 
Director, Security and Safety 
Aerospace Corporation 
310-336-5458 
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Appendix B: 
Written by Leonard Fuld, a pioneer in the Competitive Intelligence (CI) field and 
founder/president of Fuld & Company, a Cambridge, MA consulting firm. 
Competitive Intelligence Is and Is Not: 
Ten descriptions of what CI is and does for a company and ten common misconceptions 
about CI; found at <www.fuld.com>. 
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Competitive Intelligence Is ... 
Information that has been analyzed to 
the point where you can make a 
decision. 
A tool to alert management to early 
warning of both threats and 
opportunities. 
A means to deliver reasonable 
assessments. Competitive intelligence 
offers approximations and best views of 
the market and the competition. It is not a 
peek at the rival's financial books. 
Reasonable assessments are what 
modern entrepreneurs such as Richard 
Branson, Bill Gates, and Michael Dell 
need, want, and use on a regular basis. 
They don't expect every detail, just the best 
assessment at the time. 
Comes in many flavors. Competitive 
intelligence can mean many things to many 
people. A research scientist sees it as a 
heads-up on a competitor's new R&D 
initiatives. A salesperson considers it 
insight on how his or her company should 
bid against another firm in order to win a 
contract. A senior manager believes 
intelligence to be a long-term view on a 
marketplace and its rivals. See our 
Strategic Intelligence Organizer tool on 
fuld.com for examples of the many flavors 
of competitive intelligence and tips on how 
to develop it. . 
Competitive Intelligence Is Not ... 
Spying. Spying implies illegal or unethical 
activities. While spying does take place, it 
is a rare activity. Think about it; 
corporations do not want to find 
themselves in court, nor do they want to 
upset shareholders. For the most part, you 
will find spies in espionage novels, not in 
the executive suite. 
A crystal ball. There is no such thing as a 
true forecasting tool. Intelligence does give 
corporations good approximations of 
reality, near- and long-term. It does not 
predict the future. 
Database search. Databases offer just 
that - data. Of course it is wonderful to 
have these remarkable tools. 
Nevertheless, databases do not massage 
or analyze the data. They certainly do not 
replace human beings who need to make 
decisions by examining the data and 
applying their common sense, experience, 
analytical tools, and intuition. 
The Internet or rumor chasing. The Net 
is primarily a communications vehicle, not 
a deliverer of intelligence. You can find 
hints at competitive strategy, but you will 
also uncover rumors disguised as fact, or 
speculation dressed up as reality. Be wary 
of how you use or misuse the Net. Its 
reach is great, but you need to sift, sort, 
and be selective on its content. 
- 44-
A way for companies to improve their 
bottom line. Companies, such as 
NutraSweet, have attributed many millions 
of dollars in earned revenue to their 
intelligence usage. See our CI Success 
Stories on fuld. com for over 100 excerpts 
telling how companies have used CI 
successfully. 
A way of life, a process. If a company 
uses CI correctly, it becomes a way of life 
for everyone in the corporation - not just 
the strategic planning or marketing staff. It 
is a process by which critical information is 
available for anyone who needs it. That 
process might be helped by 
computerization, but its success rests upon 
the people and their ability to use it. 
Part of all best-in-class companies. In 
my 20 years of consulting in this arena, I 
have witnessed that high-quality, best-in-
class corporations apply competitive 
intelligence consistently. The Malcolm 
Baldridge Quality Award, the most 
prestigious total quality award for American 
corporations, includes the gathering and 
use of external market information (a.k.a. 
CI) as one of its winning qualifications. 
Paper. Paper is the death of good 
intelligence. Think face-to-face discussion 
or a quick phone call if you can, rather than 
paper delivery. Never equate paper with 
competitive intelligence. Yes, you must 
have a way to convey critical intelligence. 
Unfortunately, many managers think that 
by spending countless hours on computer-
generated slides, charts and graphs, and 
footnoted reports, they have delivered 
intelligence. All they have managed to do 
is to slow down the delivery of critical 
intelligence. In the process, they have 
likely hidden the intelligence by over-
analyzing it. Remember: Paper cannot 
argue a point - you can. 
A job for one, smart person. A CEO 
might appoint one individual to oversee the 
CI process, but that one person cannot do 
it all. At best, the CI Ringmaster, the 
coordinator of the program, keeps 
management informed and ensures that 
others in the organization become trained 
in ways to apply this tool within each of 
their SBUs. 
An invention of the 20th century. CI has 
been around as long as business itself. It 
may have operated under a different name, 
or under no name at all, but it was always 
present. Just review the story surrounding 
19th century British financier Nathan 
Rothschild, who managed to corner the 
market on British government securities by 
receiving early warning of Napoleon's 
defeat at Waterloo. He used carrier 
pigeons, the E-mail of his day. He knew 
the information to watch and how to make 
sense of it; in the end, he used this 
intelligence to make a killing in the market. 
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Directed from the executive suite. The 
best-in-class intelligence efforts receive 
their direction and impetus from the CEO. 
While the CEO may not run the program, 
he dedicates budget and personnel; most 
important, he promotes its use. 
Seeing outside yourself. Companies that 
successfully apply competitive intelligence 
gain an ability to see outside themselves. 
CI pushes the not-invented-here syndrome 
out the window. 
Both short- and long-term. A company 
can use intelligence for many immediate 
decisions, such as how to price a product 
or place an advertisement. At the same 
time, you can use the same set of data to 
decide on long-term product development 
or market positioning. 
Software. Software does not in and of 
itself yield intelligence. The CI market is 
hot, and numerous software houses are 
producing products for the intelligence 
marketplace. Many more are repositioning 
existing software - in particular, data 
warehousing and data mining packages -
for use in intelligence. Software has 
become an important weapon in the CI 
arsenal, but it does not truly analyze. It 
collects, contrasts, and compares. True 
analysis is a process of people reviewing 
and making sense of the information. 
A news story. Newspaper or television 
reports are very broad and are not timely 
enough for managers concerned with 
specific competitors and competitive 
issues. If a manager first learns of an 
industry event from a newspaper or 
magazine report, chances are others in the 
industry already learned of the news 
through other channels. While media 
reports may yield interesting sources for 
the CI analyst to interview, they are not 
always the most timely, or specific enough 
for critical business decisions. 
A spreadsheet. "If it's not a number, it's 
not intelligence." This is an unspoken, but 
often thought of, refrain among managers. 
"If you can't multiply it, then it is not valid ." 
Intelligence comes in many forms, only one 
of which is a spreadsheet or some 
quantifiable result. My firm has completed 
numerous strategic assessments, where 
the numbers only address one aspect of 
. the problem. Management thinking, 
marketing strategy, and ability to innovate 
are only three among a host of issues that 
rely on a wide range of subjective, non-
numeric intelligence. 
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Appendix C: 
Compiled by the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals. 
An Overview of the Competitive Intelligence (CI) Field 
This PowerPoint presentation is available at <www.scip.org>. 
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What is Competitive Intelligence (eI)? 
CI is a systematic & ethical 
program for gathering and 
analyzing information about 
your competitors' activities 
and general business trends 
further your own company' 
goals 
Adapted from "Competitive Intelligence" by Larry Kahaner 
What Intelligence Can Be Obtained Legally 
and Ethically? 
80%-90% of 
all information 
is public 
knowledge 
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What is the CI Function and Process? 
Communicate 
Adaptedfrom William Y. Wilson, NextStep and Timothy W Powell, InfoStrat. 
What Principles and Skills are Needed for the 
Function? 
V"V''''UP'''''' by SelP in association with the Monitor Company 
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Where Are the Sources For CI? 
Sources of CI (by extent of use) 
Very little use 
• Product purcbasiJig 
• Freeddm of information act 
• Clipping services • F ocU$ groups 
• Security analysis • Case studies 
• C-om~tors (contact directly) • Mail ~estionnaires 
• Personal interviews 
• SupplierS 
Based on the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals 1997 Salary Survey 
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Who Are the Best Internal Clients 
For CI? 
Market 
Planning 
& Research 
Financial 
Planning 
D 
Based on the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals 1997 Salary Survey 
What Methods Are Available to Gather 
CI? 
~ Comparative 
profiles 
~TQM 
~ Benchmarking 
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~ Bas,elining 
~ CI systems 
How Are Organizations Using These 
Methods? 
7% of companies 
Dedicated CI professionals 
at corporate & divisions. 
Department specialists 
tending to develop & 
use their own intelligence. 
Dedicated staffs for 
organization of 
information only. 
Part-time responsibility 
of corporate librarian. 
900/0 of companies 
ad hoc full-time 
What is the Framework For Accessing, Sharing, and 
Utilizing CI Across the Organization? 
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Can Companies Have the Right Intelligence, B 
Not Share or Utilize it Effe . · ely? 
How Can You Create Structures For Using CI 
Effectively Within a Company? 
I '~issemination of C 
Modes of Dissemination (In order of perceived effectiveness) 
• Custom reports • Computerized databases 
• Personal communications • Newsletter 
• Presentations • Regular meetings 
• Special memos • Training Seminars 
• E-mail • Bulletin Boards 
• Competitor files • Special Retreats 
Based on the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals 1997 Salary Survey 
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How is Information Made Available But 
Improperly Employed at High Levels? 
Decision 
makers don't 
act in a 
.omely maDDe Information 
is incorrect 
or incomplete 
is 
isinterprete 
Decision 
makers . 
isunderstan 
CI 
Organizations Don't Make Decisions, 
People Do. 
What Should You Consider When Setting Up 
and Maintaining an On-Going CI Process? 
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What Is the Objective 
of the Program and 
How Is It 
How Do Y ou Ensure That CI is 
Strategy Driven? 
CI Professionals' Roles Within 
Organizations 
Market Planning & Research 
• CIIAnalysis 
o Strategic Planning 
o Info Center/Services 
12% 
R&D, Business Development, 
Product Planning 
• Financial 
Planning/Counterintelligence . 
26% 
Based on the Society of Competitive intelligence Professionals 1997 Salary Survey 
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25% 
Who is in the CI Field? 
Type: Work in: Doing: 
Practitioners A corporation Ad Hoc requests (50010) to 
76.8% tracking (50%) 
Vendors or Independent consultants or Strategy applications of 
Consultants consulting practice developed CIon project & 
17.5% subscription basis seminars 
Academics A university or college Teaching research methods. 
2.1% Authoring books in CI 
business. Proiect consulting. 
Students A university or college Full-time studies. 
3.6% 
Based on the membership of the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals 
CI Professionals' Demographics 
Years in CI profession: 52% 1-3 years 
1 7% 4-5 years 
23% 6-12 years 
Professional work 10% 1-5 years 
experIence: 16% 6-10 years 
42% 11-20 years 
Median salary: $63,000 
Size of CI staff: 73% 1-3 per unit 
22% 4-10 per unit 
Education: 93 % university education 
65% advanced degrees 
Based on the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals 1997 Salary Survey 
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# Members 
SCIP Membership 
Growth Trend 
8000 ~----------------------------------------
7000+---------------------------------------
6000 +----------------------------------: 
5000+-----------------------------~£ 
4000 +--------------------------
3000 +-----------------------: 
2000 +-----------------: 
1000 
o 
'90 '91 '92 '93 '94 '95 '96 '97 '98 
The Industries of SCIP Members 
Healtbcare 
Public Utilities 
Industrial 
Defense/Aerospace "', • U 
Banking/Financial 
Computers 
. 11 
Information 
Chem.lPharma. 
Communication % 
Consulting 
6 2 4 6 8 16 
Based on the Society o/Competitive Intelligence Professionals 1997 Salary Survey 
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12 
"Advantage is a better 
soldier than rashness." 
society 
of 
competitive 
intelligence 
professionals 
William Shakespeare, 
King Henry V 
"The model for management that 
. we have right now is the opera ... 
yet business should be emulating 
a good jazz group ... you have to 
develop the score as you go 
along." 
Peter F. Drucker, 
author and management 
consultant 
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N 
, 
"We are drowning 
in information but 
starved for 
knowledge." 
John Naisbitt, 
Chairman of the Naisbitt Group 
"You don't just set your 
compass and head south 
- or you will quickly run 
aground. Instead, you 
i steer from point to point 
according to how the river 
is running and the 
obstacles that appear in 
your path." 
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Abraham Lincoln 
on how to govern 
as one would steer 
a riverboat 
Appendix D: 
Managing Sensitive Information in a Joint Venture 
This overview contains specific recommendations for documentation and management of 
confidential information in a joint venture. 
Compiled from information found in Wolf pp. 230-233. 
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The confidentiality agreement 
The confidentiality agreement appears when the parties, even operating with the 
clear understanding that they are in an exploratory phase, are asked to exchange 
or give access to information of a confidential nature, trade secrets that should 
not be known by competitors. It would not be unusual for a confidentiality 
agreement to be executed after considerable negotiations between the parties 
and it is an agreement naturally prepared by legal counsel. 
The confidentiality agreement has become an important complement particularly 
in industries or services where the secret of the business is not in patented rights 
or technology licenses but in trade secrets, commercial practices that cannot 
receive formal, written protection, such as a copyright, but that nevertheless are 
crucial to the success of the enterprise. A typical example is a specialized mailing 
list built up through the years and that is productive for mail-marketing purposes. 
No information should be disclosed without a proper agreement defining the 
responsibility of all parties. It is not that the law requires a written agreement. A 
verbal agreement may be perfectly enforceable. However, if the information is of 
serious commercial value, the vagueness and ambiguities that characterize 
verbal agreements are sufficient for choosing a formal agreement instead. The 
agreement should be reduced to writing and the solemnity of its terms 
emphasized. This will contribute to its being voluntarily implemented. 
Breach of a confidentiality agreement subjects the defaulting party to a claim for 
damages. However, this right is more theoretical than practical. When large 
corporations are involved, the agreement surely has an important moral force. 
Nevertheless, plaintiffs seeking damages for breach of the confidentiality 
agreement have a difficult burden of demonstrating what are the damages 
incurred and, if the information is disclosed to unauthorized third parties, its 
circulation in the commercial world cannot be prevented easily. 
Inserting a statement as to the agreed-on damages for default in the 
confidentiality agreement may not be a valid clause, a question for local counsel, 
but in any event, unless the amount is very high, out of proportion to the value of 
the secret, it is an invitation to disclosure if the information gained is worth more 
than the penalty to pay. 
There is a serious dilemma in confidential transactions for the seller. For the 
buyer to request to have access to the records and information of the seller is a 
normal solicitation. It may not even be possible to seriously consider a joint 
venture without having more information. There thus arises a conflict: If 
information is not revealed, there can be no further progress; if information is 
revealed but negotiations fail, valuable information has been given away. How 
can this be resolved? Two suggestions are a clear delineation as to what is the 
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confidential information and then its managed disclosure according to some 
simple rules. The possibility of damages should be considered as a last resort. 
Defining the subject matter of confidential information 
The most important subject matter is what it is that is being considered 
confidential. Merely stating that all information given is confidential does not 
contribute to clarity; nor stating that all information of a commercial nature 
constitutes a trade secret; nor claiming all confidential information belongs to the 
seller. A serious effort must be made to define as well as possible what is meant 
by confidential information; such a description then can be followed by general 
clauses of confidentiality. The more detailed the description, the more important 
will seem the material sought to be protected. 
The management of confidential information 
Negotiations begin. An interest is confirmed. Further information is requested. 
Even with an agreement, there is no need to rush to deliver all confidential 
information available. Certain guidelines can be established subsequent to the 
signing of the confidentiality agreement: 
• Management should separate vital knowledge from information that is a natural 
activity in most companies. How to make a product is very different from where 
you purchase the materials. The latter is also important but not critical. Insider 
information then should be divulged in harmony with the advance of negotiations. 
As negotiations become more close to a contract, the quality of the knowledge 
being given can also increase, become more unique in its application. 
• Information should be given only after a certain level of agreement is reached 
on major issues. One does not r.eveal confidential 'information merely because 
another party may have interest. The level of interest is difficult to determine but 
there surely should be agreement on price and the equity contribution of each 
party. 
• The information can be given initially in written summaries. This establishes a 
reference for what areas are considered confidential and the buyer is put on 
notice. 
• Representative information can be given. It is not necessary to furnish a copy of 
an entire client list broken down by city and products. Sample information can be 
given. 
• The buyer or potential partner should have to channel his requests in a formal 
procedure, and if possible to the same party. This tends to make personal the 
assumption of the confidentiality obligation and also establishes a simpler 
method of proof should the condition be broken. 
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• For the same reason, releasing the information should be done in the same 
room and in a formal manner. This emphasizes the seriousness of the 
information being given. A rapport may develop between the participants, which 
contributes to honoring the promises of confidentiality given. 
• A point often overlooked is a failure to place a limitation on the copies of 
information made and in general controlling the copy process. The more there 
are formalities, the more serious the information received will be considered. It 
would be perfectly advisable to record how many copies have been made of any 
item, to whom given, and when. 
• The entities entitled to receive the information should be defined as narrowly as 
possible, for example, auditors, financial officers, attorneys, and specified 
categories of key personnel. 
• A decision has to be made as to the consequences of a misuse of the 
information received. Two options are to make all parties responsible who 
misuse the information and the other is to have one primary party responsible, 
the buyer who must take the necessary precautions with third parties, such as 
employees. It is simpler to place the responsibility on the inquiring buyer as this 
is likely to be a corporation and be able to respond in damages. 
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Appendix E: 
Competitive Intelligence and the Economic Espionage Act: 
An overview of the EEA and its impact on the CI field. 
Prepared by the Society for Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP). 
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A Policy Analysis Adopted 
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SCIP Board of Directors 
Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals 
1700 Diagonal Road, Suite 600 
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Introduction 
In October 1996, the u.s. president signed into law the Economic Espionage Act 
(EEA). The EEA makes stealing or obtaining trade secrets by fraud (and buying or 
receiving secrets so obtained) a U.S. federal crime. Upon passage of the EEA, some 
members of the competitive intelligence (CI) community expressed concern that the 
EEA could have implications for the conduct of CI. 
After the passage of the EEA, SCIP organized two symposia, one in February 1997 
and another in February 1998, on the topiC ofCI, ethics, and law. The purpose of these 
events, and of several publications and articles published by SCIP, was to promote 
education and understanding of the law and its implications for the CI profession 
among SCIP's membership and in industry at large. 
Many members of the Society felt it was important to develop a clear statement to 
define the impact of the EEA on the CI profession and clear up any confusion about the 
relationship between the EEA and CI. This policy statement, the result of extensive 
research and consultation, addresses that relationship. The policy statement was 
prepared by Richard Horowitz, a SCIP member who is an attomey and private investi-
gator. It was subsequently adopted by the SCIP board of directors and endorsed by 
leading legal experts. Their endorsements are also included in this booklet. 
Competitive intelligence is the legal and ethical collection and synthesis of data 
and information to enhance business decision making. SCIP members endorse this 
definition. 
- Ava Harth Youngblood, SCIP '98-99 president 
selP Code of Ethics for Cl Professionals 
• To continually strive to increase respect and recognition for the profession. 
• To pursue one's duties with zeal and diligence while maintaining the highest 
degree of professionalism and aVOiding all unethical practices. 
• To faithfully adhere to and abide by one's company's policies, objectives and 
guidelines. 
• To comply with all applicable laws. 
• To accurately disclose all relevant information, including one's identity and 
organization, prior to all interviews. 
• To fully respect all requests for confidentiality of information. 
• To promote and encourage full compliance with these ethical standards within 
one's company, with third party contractors, and within the entire profession. 
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Introduction to the SeIP 
Policy Analysis on 
Competitj"e Intelligence and 
the Economic Espionage Act 
Richard Horowitz. Esq. 
Legal and Investigative Services 
400 Madison Avenue. Suite 1411 
New York. NY 10017. USA 
Tel.: +1.212.829.8196 
Fax: +1.212.829.8199 
RHESQ@compuserve.com 
Under the auspices of the SCIP ethics committee and 
as requested by the SCIP board of directors. I have 
prepared this policy analysis. adopted by SelP's board of 
directors. 
The question of the EEA's effect on CI has been an 
issue of concern in the CI industry. I believe that the 
significant diffICulty for many in understanding what 
effect if any the EEA has on CI is that this issue reflects a 
confluence of law and security. two topics that are not 
generally included in a college or graduate school educa-
tion. For example. the EEA is a statute. and a statute is not 
prose. Statutes are written without incorporating the 
underlying legal principles into their wording. The frustra-
tion many have felt after reading the EEA and still not 
understanding how it affects CI is because these underly-
ing legal principles which are essential to understanding 
the law's application Will not emerge from the text. regard-
less of fonts. graphics, or the statute's layout on the page. 
I have always maintained that CI practitioners who 
act consistently with SCIP's code of ethics should not run 
afoul of the EEA. It is my hope that this policy analysis will 
assist members of the CI industry to understand why this 
is so. For those who would like a more in-depth analysis. 
see my article "The Economic Espionage Act: The Rules 
Have Not Changed" in the July-September 1998 volume of 
Competitive Intelligence Review. 
I would like to thank Elkan Abramowitz, Mark 
Halligan, Peter Toren and the board of directors and staff 
ofSCIP for their assistance in the preparation of this docu-
ment. A special thanks to Mark. Peter and Hamilton Loeb 
for their assistance to me since I took an active role in this 
issue. In case there are any further questions. I can be 
reached at the address above. 
Richard Horowitz 
POLICY ANALYSIS 
Competitive IntelHgence and the 
Economic Espionage Act 
Prepared by Richard Horowitz, Esq. 
For the board of directors of Society of Competitive 
Intelligence Professionals 
Executive Summary 
Seeking competitive information in a legal and ethical 
manner is an integral component of healthy competition. 
The EEA was enacted in order to enable federal law 
enforcement to investigate and prosecute acts of 
economic espionage. It adds federal criminal penalties to 
activities which were already illegal under state law. The 
EEA does not interfere with the way corporations are enti-
tled to gain a competitive advantage in the marketplace 
by seeking information on a competitor in a legal manner. 
That the EEA does not materially affect competitive 
intelligence (CI) does not mean that CI professionals need 
not be concerned about trade secret law. On the contrary. 
the EEA has drawn attention to the necessity of insuring 
that CI activities are within the parameters of trade secret 
law. 
An understanding of trade secret law and the EEA 
indicates that CI professionals who have been and will 
continue to conduct their business in an ethical manner 
and consistent with established trade secret law need not 
be concerned about the EEA debate~ 
. Companies that have curtailed their CI efforts out of a 
misplaced fear of the EEA have awarded a competitive 
advantage to companies whose CI activities continue 
unimpeded. 
Background 
The Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals 
(SCIP) is the global professional society for practitioners 
of business or competitive intelligence (CI). Established 
in 1986. SCIP tooay has more than 5.000 members and 
continues to grow substantially year after year. 
Seeking information on a competitor is an important 
component of healthy competition; CI is the term which 
has developed to describe this profession. Many corpora-
tions and executives perfonn this function without any 
formal ties to the CI profession. while others employ CI 
professionals or outside CI firms and practitioners. Many 
large corporations have established entire CI depart-
ments. Competitive intelligence is a recognized. 
- 67-
accepted, and legal way for businesses to gain a competi-
tive advantage in the marketplace. This in turn accelerates 
the benefits to society of competition in the marketplace. 
SCIP encourages its members to abide by its code of 
ethics; one clause in the code instructs its members to 
"accurately disclose all relevant information, including 
one's identity and organization, prior to all interviews." 
The Economic Espionage Act of October 1996 (EEA) 
was enacted by the U.S. Congress in response to attempts 
by foreign entities to steal American trade secrets. It was 
not enacted in order to regulate the CI industry nor was it 
enacted in response to any problems arising out of the 
activities of CI professionals. Its passage however has led 
to various and sometimes conflicting opinions regarding 
the EEA and has created confusion regarding its implica-
tions for the practice of CI. 
The EEA is a federal criminal law and was passed in 
order to enable federal authorities to investigate and pros-
ecute acts of economic espionage. 
Federal authorities charged with the responsibility of 
protecting national security and the national economy 
were confronted with the reality that laws dealing with the 
theft of trade secrets were state law, and needed a federal 
law to give them the authority to investigate and prose-
cute the increasing number of cases of economic espi-
onage conducted by foreign entities. The EEA was passed 
to do just that. 
Congress decided however that the scope of the EEA . 
would include the theft of a trade secret by anyone, for 
anyone. In other words, the EEA is not limited to theft of a 
trade secret for a foreign entity, but encompasses theft of 
a trade secret by and for a domestic competitor. 
Herein lies the confusion. While the EEA makes trade 
secret law a federal criminal matter - this for the first time 
in U.S. history - the activities it criminalizes had always 
been prohibited under state law and/or inconsistent with 
SCIP's code of ethics. In other words, the rules are funda-
mentally the same but the consequences of violating them 
are different. An activity that had always been a violation of 
state trade secret law can now result in not only state civil 
liability but federal criminal liability as well. 
Implications 
There are several reasons why the EEA should not 
have any impact on the practice of competitive intelli-
gence. 
First, the act of seeking and collecting information on 
a competitor is itself legal. Note the following from the 
Restatement of Torts (1939): 
The privilege to compete with others includes 
a privilege to adopt their business methods, ideas. 
or processes of manufacture. Were it otherwise, 
the fIrSt person in the field with a new process or 
idea would have a monopoly which would tend to 
prevent competition (Section 757, Comment a). 
One limitation on this rule cited by the Restatement 
is: "It is the employment of improper means to procure 
the trade secret, rather than the mere copying or use, 
which is the basis of liability in this section." 
Information collection performed by CI professionals 
centers around the sophisticated use of published mater-
ial, databases, and on-the-record interviews, techniques 
which themselves are legal and proper means of acquiring 
information. 
Second, properly trained CI professionals who have 
conducted themselves in an ethical manner were not 
engaged in legally risky business prior to the EEA. The 
appropriate legal principles have been instilled into the CI 
profession over the years of its existence and subse-
quently adopted as practice by properly trained industry 
members. The increased penalties for trade secret theft 
under the EEA will not be-applicable to those whose prac-
tice has been consistent with the already existing legal 
standards. 
Third, most situations commonly referred to as "gray 
zone" areas are not trade secret violations at all. Though 
they raise ethical questions. -gray zone" situations such as 
rmding a lost document in the street, overhearing 
competitors talk on a plane, having a drink with a 
competitor knowing you are better at holding your liquor, 
removing your name tag at a trade show, or even falsely 
identifying yourself as a student, are situations which 
alone will not trigger trade secret liability. Properly trained 
CI professionals should be able to identify and avoid the 
predicaments that would place them in actual legal risk. 
Fourth, the EEA will not be applied to general 
commercial disputes, but to clear criminal acts of theft. 
The reason for the EEA's passage was to thwart attempts at 
stealing American trade secrets which would have an 
impact on the competitiveness and health of the Ameri-
can economy. That the U.S. Attorney General promised 
Congress that no charges will by filed under the EEA for 
the fIrst five years after the law's enactment without the 
approval of the Attorney General or two of her top 
deputies indicates that federal authorities have no inten-
tion of becoming entangled in the numerous trade secret 
disputes that do take place in the routine course of busi-
ness (see Congressional Record. October 2,1994, S12214). 
To summarize, the EEA incorporates into the federal 
criminal code activities that were already illegal under 
state law. It does not add new burdens or restrictions to 
the American workforce. 
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A Note on btratenitoriaHty 
About twenty percent of SCIP's membership is 
outside the USA, making the question of how the EEA 
affects overseas activity pertinent. 
The EEA does have an extraterritoriality clause. In 
principle, a statute must state that it applies overseas for it 
to so apply. The extraterritoriality provisions of the EEA 
apply the statute to a U.S. citizen even abroad, and to a 
non-U.S. citizen (1) while on U.S. soil or (2) abroad, if the 
act committed abroad violates the EEA and "an act in 
furtherance of the offense was committed in the United 
States." 
What this means in practice is that whatever types of 
activities the EEA prohibits overseas are the same as what 
is prohibited on U.S. soil, which, as explained, had always 
been prohibited by state law and! or inconsistent with 
SCIP's code of ethics. 
EEA CompHance Plans 
An additional reason for concern regarding the impli-
cations of the EEA on competitive intelligence has been 
the many calls for "EEA compliance plans" based on the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The Sentencing Guide-
lines do not instruct, dictate, require, prescribe, or oblig-
ate a company to have a compliance plan. The Sentencing 
Guidelines, the manual by which federal judges must 
sentence a defendant, allows the judge to deduct "points" 
from the sentence, i.e., lessen the sentence, if a corporate 
defendant, not an individual defendant, took measures to 
"detect and prevent" the criminal activity from occurring. 
A proper compliance can lower the sentence of a corpora-
tion convicted of a crime; it has no relevance to the 
sentencing of an individual convicted of a crime. 
The list of seven "must haves" from the Sentencing 
Guidelines, referred to in EEA compliance plan articles 
and presentations are not obligatory (i.e., "The organiza-
tion must have established compliance standards and 
procedures .. . the organization must have taken steps to 
communicate effectively its standards and procedures to 
all employees and other agents ... "). The document is talk-
ing to the judge, not the corporate defendant. The corpo-
rate defendant "must have" taken these steps in order for 
the judge to fmd that a reasonable plan to "detect and 
prevent" crime was in place, not that the company "must 
have" done these things as an independent legal obliga-
tion. 
The Sentencing Guidelines do not actually use the 
phrase "compliance plan." This is the tenn which has 
developed to refer to the measures to "detect and prevent" 
violations oflaw. A company that does not have a compli-
ance plan is not "in violation" of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, and if not convicted pf a particular crime, the 
lack of a compliance plan for that aspect of law will be of 
no consequence. Conversely, a company convicted of a 
federal crime will not be penalized for not having a 
compliance plan but will lose its chance of receiving a 
lowered sentence. Though not a legal requirement under 
the Guidelines, in practice having a compliance plan is the 
responsible and indeed the expected way for a company 
to conduct its affairs . 
There are no "EEA regulations" to comply with. One is 
to learn what not to do and not do it. Generally speaking, 
compliance plans are geared to aspects of law that are 
industry specific and encompass regulations. Banks will 
have a compliance plan for Treasury Department regula-
tions, pharmaceutical companies for FDA regulatiOns, 
securities dealers for SEC regulations, and telecommuni-
cations companies for FCC regulations. As the activities 
the EEA criminalizes are substantially the same activities 
in which CI professionals should never have been 
engaged, an EEA "compliance plan" should not be 
substantially different from the existing professional 
guidelines a CI firm or profeSSional would be expected to 
have or abide by. 
Answers to Frequently Aslced Questions 
1. Even if the EEA was not intended to deal with 
competitive intelligence or general commercial disputes, 
hasn't it had an impact nonetheless? 
Answer: The impact the EEA has had on the CI 
community has been based on anxiety and confusion. 
Some companies have mistakenly taken the position that 
the EEA has placed them in legal jeopardy because of the· 
activities of their CI professionals. 
Ironically, companies who curtail the legal and ethical 
activities of their CI professionals have placed themselves 
at a competitive disadvantage to companies whose CI 
activities continue unimpeded. 
2. Don't we have to wait to see how the EEA is applied 
in the courts before determining what it prohibits? 
Answer: How courts ultimately interpret statutes is a 
fundamental part of legal analysis. This does not mean 
however that one cannot understand the basic prohibi-
tions of a statute. In fact, a statute can be declared uncon-
stitutional by the courts if it does not provide adequate 
notice as to what it prohibits. 
The intention and purpose behind the EEA was 
clearly explained by Congress prior to its enactment. This 
did not include an intention to alter the fundamentals of 
corporate conduct, but to deter and punish the criminal 
act of trade secret theft. 
3. Can't the EEA be applied to situations it was not 
intended to cover? 
- 69 - . 
Answer: It is not unusual for some laws to ultimately 
be applied to unforeseen situations. A law once passed 
may take on a life of its own. The concern that the EEA will 
be applied to routine commercial disputes was discussed 
and dismissed by Congress prior to the EEA's passage, with 
the Attorney General's letter giving further assurances to 
this effect (see page 4) . Companies who remain 
concerned are well-advised to study the background of 
the law. 
4. The defmition of a trade secret under the EEA is 
broader than existing trade secret law. What implications 
does this have on competitive intelligence? 
Answer: The wording of the EEA's defmition enumer-
ates more types of information considered a trade secret 
than previous legal defmitions. This is because a criminal 
statute should be written in explicit language so as to give 
notice as to what it criminalizes, otherwise it risks being 
declared unconstitutional. This does not mean that prior 
legal defmitions excluded types of infonnation enumer-
ated in the EEA's definition. 
In practice, existing legal defmitions and case law 
interpretations cover all sorts of fmancial, business, and 
scientific information. 
Whether the information stolen is included in the 
EEA's definition of a trade secret is moot with respect to 
professionals whose conduct precludes them from engag-
ing in theft. 
S. What effect if any does the EEA have on the legal 
risks one may decide to take in seeking information on a 
competitor? 
Answer: The EEA compounds the legal consequences 
for one engaged in theft of a trade secret by adding federal 
criminal penalties to an act which already triggers state 
civil penalties. This added risk however is of no conse-
quence to one who seeks information on a competitor in 
a legal manner. 
6. What implication does the EEA have on a 
company's efforts to protect information? 
Answer: The EEA focuses primarily on the activities it 
prohibits. The EEA's definition of a trade secret however, 
like state trade secret law preceding it, requires the trade 
secret holder to take reasonable measures to keep that 
information secret. In practice, the holder of a trade secret 
must have taken those reasonable measures in order for 
one who misappropriates that information to be held 
liable under the EEA or state trade secret law. 
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VIA OVERNIGHT COURIER 
SCIP Board of Directors 
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ERIC D. COHEN 
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TELEPHONE (703) 41 .... 777 
Re: Competitive I11telligellCe IIIUl tIu EcoM1IIie Espionage Act 
Dear Board Members: 
As you know, I teach trade secrets law at John Marshall Law School and I am an active 
practitioner and retained expert in trade secret cases around the country. See 
http://www.execpc.com!-mhallignlr~sumel. html. 
At Richard Horowitz's request, I have reviewed his (8117/98) draft entitled "Proposed 
Policy Analysis: Competitive Intelligence and the Economic Espionage Act." 
This is a well written draft and I endorse it. I strongly agree with the basic underlying 
premise -- The EEA does not materially affect competitive intelligence activities and companies 
should not curtail competitive intelligence activities based on a "misplaced fear" of the EEA. 
In fact, just the opposite is true. Companies should increase competitive intelligence activities 
to meet the challenge of an increasingly global competitive environment. 
My summary of "Reported Criminal Arrests Under the Economic Espionage Act of 
1996" is the most up-to-date information available on EEA prosecutions and convictions. It is 
available on the Internet at http://www.execpc.com/-mhallign/indiCl.html. As you can see, 
these EEA prosecutions involve trade secret theft and bear no reasonable relationship whatsoever 
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seIP Board of Directors 
to legitimate competitive intelligence activities. 
February 11, 1999 
Page 2 
If I can be of further assistance to the SCIP Board of Directors, please contact me at 
1-312-526-1559. 
Very truly yours, 
ft. t{-L ~_ 
R. Mark Halligan 
RMH/js 
cc: Richard Horowitz, Esq. 
I...eaer4 .380 
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SCIP Board of Directors 
Peter J. Toren 
525 University Ave. 
Palo Alto, CA 94301 
Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals 
1700 Diagonal Road 
Suite 520 
Alexandria, VA 22314 
Re: Economic Espionage Act of 1996 
Dear Board Members: 
I was fonnerly a trial attorney with the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property 
Section of the United States Department of Justice where I was involved in drafting the 
Economic Espionage Act of 1996 ("EEA"), and was the lead prosecutor on one of the 
first cases brought under the EEA. In addition, I am a co-author of an article entitled 
"Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of 1996," 5 Tex. Int. Prop. L.J. 177 (Winter 
1997). Currently, I am a Special Counsel in the San Francisco and Palo Alto offices of 
Heller Ehrman White and McAuliffe. 
At Richard Horowitz's request, I have reviewed SCIP's "Proposed Policy 
Analysis: Competitive Intelligence and the Economic Espionage Act" and offer the 
following comments. 
The EEA was intended to address both the general need for a federal criminal 
deterrent against trade secret theft and the apparent threat of industrial espionage 
sponsored by foreign countries. The EEA was not intended to impose new restrictions on 
American businesses. I agree with the Policy Analysis that the EEA was not developed in 
order to regulate the competitive intelligence community, nor was it developed in 
response to any problems that might have existed in the competitive intelligence 
community. Competitive intelligence practitioners who abide by SCIP's Code of Ethics 
should not be in violation of the EEA. If I can be of further assistance to the SCIP Board 
of Directors, please call me at (650) 324-7156 or e-mail meatbmtsdad@AOL.com. 
Peter J. Toren 
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March 2, 1999 
Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals 
1700 Diago~ Road 
Suite 520 
Alexandria, VA 22314 
Re: Economic Espionage Act of 1996 
Dear Board Members: 
DAVID AX .. N 
... NIRUDH .... N.AL 
NEI L N •• ,utOP'SKY 
DAVID A. aATTAT 
STEVEN H • • RtSLOW 
MICHAEL,. . BUCHANAN 
J ... MES C. DUGAN 
REHCCA A . GLASER 
R . .JO.£PH o..lBKO 
RACHEL III. HEALD 
MICHAEL R. NARRA 
MARC E ...... STER. 
I«LEH L . MONACO 
GRETCHAN R. OHLIO 
JOOI "'SHI:R ~IKIN 
MAE C. OUII""'· 
JOSHUA H. IIEfSMAN 
ELIZAal:TH SMALL 
PETEA N . SPETT 
JOSE~ C. SPDMtOLZ 
ALISON VAN HOAN 
·.....-rTSO OM.,. __ n.c'f or c ......... 
I am a former Chief of the Crimina) Division of the United States 
Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and co-author of the 
chapter entitled "Corporate Sentencing Under the Federal Guidelines," in Obermaier 
and Morvillo, White Collar Crime; Business and Re~atory Offenses. 
At Richard Horowitz's request, I have reviewed his (1127/99) draft 
entitled "Proposed Policy Analysis: Competitive Intelligence and The Economic 
Espionage Act," particularly the section dealing with the sentencing guidelines and 
compliance plans. 
Mr. Horowitz has written an interesting and informative submission, 
pOinting out the relationship between compliance plans and the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines as they relate to corporations. His analysis is incisive and important. 
.. ..- ··0 ... : .. ". p'- '.. .' 
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MORVILLO, ASRAt040WITZ. GRAND, IASON & SILBERBERG. P. C. 
seIP Board of Directors -2- March 2, 1999 
I agree with his analysis that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines do not create a legal 
obligation for a corporation to create a compliance plan. 
If I can be of further assistance to the SeIP Board of Directors, please 
feel free to contact me at the above number. 
Very truly yours, 
~aJo~~ 1MB. 
EAles EIkan Abramowitz 
cc: Richard Horowitz, Esq. 
-75 -
Appendix F: 
Online Resources: 
A list of informational internet resources for competitive intelligence, intellectual 
property, and general economic and national security 
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American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) - www.asisonline.org 
Competitive Intelligence Guide by Fuld & Company, Inc. - www.fuld.com 
Competitive Intelligence Handbook for business - www.combsinc.comlhandbook.htm 
Defense Security Service (DSS) counterintelligence information -
www.dss.mil/cithreatslindex.htm 
Economic and competitive intelligence links - www.loyola.edu/dept/politics/ecintel.html 
FBI's National Security Awareness Program (ANSIR) -
w.ww .fbi. gov Iprogramsl ansirl ansir.htm 
Information Security magazine online - www.infosecuritymag.com 
Intellectual Property Owners Association - www.ipo.org 
Marketing and competitive intelligence resource focused on the United Kingdom -
www.marketing-intelligence.co.uklaware/sitemap.htm 
National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) - www.nipc.gov 
National Security Institute's Security Resource Net - www.nsi.org 
Security Management magazine online - www.securitymanagement.com 
Society for Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP) - www.scip.org 
U.S. Department of Justice computer crime and intellectual property crime section-
www .cybercrime.gov 
U.S. Department of State's Overseas Security Advisory Council- www.ds-osac.org 
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